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Abstract
Structured Occurrence Nets (SONs) are a Petri net based formalism for
portraying the behaviour of complex evolving systems. As a concept,
SONs are derived from Occurrence Nets (ONs). SONs provide a powerful
framework for evolving system analysis and are supported by the existing
SONCraft toolset. On the other hand, modelling of cybercrime investi-
gations has become of interest in recent years, and large-scale criminal
investigations have been considered as complex evolving systems. Right
now, they present a significant challenge for police investigators and an-
alysts. The current thesis contributes to addressing this challenge in two
different ways: (i) by presenting an algorithm and an implemented tool
that visualise data sets using maximal concurrency; and (ii) by detecting
DNS tunnelling through a novel SON-based technique and tool. Moreover,
the theoretical contribution of this thesis focuses on model extensions and
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Today’s increasingly complex computing, commercial and societal systems are be-
coming more of a challenge for researchers, investigators, and analysts. Through the
ongoing processes of discovery and analysis, the latter ultimately end up contributing
to the evolution of these systems. As far as a ‘complex system’ goes, an attempt
to provide an exhaustive definition may be daunting. However, a broad definition
has been reached, according to which a complex system generally implies an intricate
structure, and generally consists of a number of subsystems that interact with one
another and are subject to various external stimuli. Moreover, a complex system is
usually characterised by constant evolution, meaning it is not created within a single
moment, but rather it is the result of evolution occurring over time. As an example,
a complex evolving system may be biological, or informational in nature. One spe-
cific example of such a system is a cybercrime modelling and investigation system.
Each such system consists of several subsystems that interact with one another. This
process of communication between them may be synchronous or asynchronous.
Cybercrime modelling and investigation systems use various methods and tools
supporting investigations, ranging from complex networks to partial differential equa-
tions, and statistical analyses. The modelling and investigation of large-scale, criminal
cases are now increasingly considered as an instance of complex evolving systems, and
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their complexity makes them a significant challenge for police investigators. The vi-
sualisation of big data sets in a user-friendly and suitable way makes it possible for
investigators to have a clearer image of the events which occurred, allowing them
to link crime events and places with the purpose of getting a clearer representation
that could simplify crime detection. In addition, the result of improved visualisation
techniques could very well constitute an essential step in preventing events such as
that from occurring in the first place. Cybercrime events are part of the criminal in-
vestigation process and constitute one of the core organisational activities for police
services [24]. The current existing literature [6] and suggested practices indicate large
scale investigations can be conducted thanks to the aforementioned mechanisms. Un-
fortunately, there are few tools that can provide support in this regard. Considering
the current academic context, along with the aforementioned considerations regard-
ing the evolution of complex cybercrime analysis, a number of theoretical focus areas
are relevant [42]. One such area [42, 59, 57] includes Structured Occurrence Nets
(SONs). The research conducted in this thesis will concern itself with the theoretical
and practical aspects of SONs. SONs [57] are a Petri net based formalism for por-
traying the behaviour of complex evolving systems. The concept of SONs is derived
from that of Occurrence Nets (ON). An occurrence net is a directed, acyclic graph
that represents causal and concurrent information regarding a single execution of a
system [58]. Within a SON, multiple ONs are linked with each other through various
types of formal relationships. They are intended to record information about: (i) the
actual or projected behaviour of complex systems, as they interact and evolve; and
(ii) the evidence that is being gathered and analysed, regarding the past behaviour
of complex evolving systems. Furthermore, SONs have the advantage of supporting
various representations of the behaviour of a complex evolving system [59, 57]. A
particularly useful way of using SONs is within sophisticated investigations. The
significance of SONs comes from their structuring and different forms of abstraction,
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which may considerably reduce the complexity of modelling and analysis, and the
fact that they provide a direct means of modelling evolving systems.
1.2 Research Question
The aim of the research programme presented in this thesis was to extend the SON
framework, so as to improve both the handling and visualisation of data sets involved
in cybercrime investigations. As such, the main research question was: “Can tools
which use SONs be used to analyse big data cybercrimes?”, followed by an immediate
additional question: “Can SONs cope with a large volume of records, stored in specific
data sources?” In more detail, the question was whether or not SONs and SON-based
tools, such as SONCraft, can provide a new approach which can be used to analyse
large cybercrime data sets, by coping with a considerable volume of data which can be
stored either online or offline. To address this question, a methodology was developed
and implemented, involving both theoretical and practical research. The main goals
of this methodology were as follows:
Goal I: Enhancing visualisation of SONs
To design and implement an algorithm to assist in visualising large data sets in
a helpful, user-friendly and understandable way. The proposed approach was
the use of semantically driven visualisation, which adopts maximal concurrency
(a step execution policy in the sense of [9]) to provide structured displays. As a
result, the new approach should lead to an effective display of complex SONs.
Working on Goal I
SONCraft was evaluated from the perspective of interaction techniques, as issues
were to be expected when inputting data into SONCraft (in particular, after
allowing the tool to automatically accept data sets). Some of these issues,
such as overlapping ONs, could be addressed by using maximal concurrency.
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Concerning the implementation of new visualisation technique, it focused on
two main purposes of data analysis, namely understanding and exploration.
The thesis addressed the challenges resulting from the overlapping and out-of-
order placement of ONs, and proposes a novel solution to deal with this issue,
based on a step-execution policy. A SON plugin implementing the resulting
algorithm was developed.
Goal II: Detecting cybercrime using SONs
To apply SONs and their features in order to detect real-data cybercrime cases
(DNS Tunnelling) in the event of an actual attack.
Working on Goal II
The research went through various stages, starting with data collection (cap-
turing real data from a local DNS server) and an extensive study of literature
pertaining to the subject. To simulate a real scenario of DNS server behaviour,
the collected data consisted of two main parts, the first of which included data
collected during the attack experiment, and real DNS traffic data. To help with
the detection of an attack, a solution based on a new algorithm was proposed,
along with a tool implementation.
Goal III: Enhancing SON theory
To extend the theoretical foundations of SONs, making it possible to abstract
large ONs via multiple-tokens.
Working on Goal III
As a result of the experiments conducted for Goal II, large SON models were
generated. Since such models were difficult to display on computers screens, a
new class of SONs was proposed. This definition extension will allow users to
use multiple tokens in a condition (local state) instead of a single token (as in
the current SON framework). This extension will also allow users to visualise
4
large-model SONs more effectively.
Goal IV: Evaluating new algorithms and tools
To thoroughly evaluate the developed algorithms and tool implementation,
demonstrating their validity and sustainability for big datasets.
Working on Goal IV
Tools developed when working on Goals I and II were applied to various cyber-
crime cases, with the purpose of assessing and evaluating the manner in which
SONs can be helpful for ‘real-life’ scenarios.
1.3 Contributions
The current thesis made the following key contributions to the improvement of SON
visualisation and cybercrime investigations analysis:
1. Visualisation algorithms were designed and developed as a Java plugin within
the SONCraft toolkit (based on the WorkCraft platform). These algorithms
were developed and implemented using the concept of maximal concurrency in
order to avoid overlapping and the out-of-order placement of ONs.
2. By using SONs in a “real-life”, cybercrime scenario, a plugin that detects DNS
tunnelling has been developed and implemented.
(a) Preprocessing Datasets (DNS packets): real data from servers was col-
lected, with the purpose of allowing SONs to accept this data. A script
was created, with the aim of dealing with DNS packets and automatically
reprocess them.
(b) A script which helps in mixing two types of data was designed and im-
plemented. These two data types include the normal data (normal packet
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DNS data) and the attack data. The purpose was to ensure the script
works in a real-life scenario.
(c) An algorithm which detects DNS attacks through the use of SONs was
designed and implemented.
3. For abstracting a large model of SONs, an extension of SONs was proposed. It
allows multiple tokens to be present in the conditions of the underlying network
structure.
4. Design and implement open-source SONCraft plug-in, which is used help users
in automatically load large amounts of data.
1.4 Thesis Structure
Chapter 1. Describes the background, knowledge and motivation behind the work
carried out in this thesis. Moreover, the chapter describes the contribution of
the research programme reported in this thesis towards the general advancement
of the relevant field and the publication of its results.
Chapter 2. Background and related work - This chapter focuses on the con-
ducted background research and the review of the existing literature and the
current “state-of-art” when it comes to Structured Occurrence Nets (SONs)
and their features (Behavioural SONs, Communication SONs, Temporal Ab-
straction SONs, and Time SONs). The chapter also discusses DNS and “DNS
Tunnelling” as concepts and describes the main challenges associated with DNS
tunnelling. Also, several techniques for DNS tunnelling detection are reviewed.
Chapter 3. Visualisation - This chapter describes visualisation as a background
concept, its framework, and the importance of visualising large data sets in
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SONs. Moreover, the chapter places focus on the algorithms which provide a
solution to the handling of large data visualisation issues within SONs.
Chapter 4. DNS Tunnelling - This chapter focuses on illustrating the challenges
within DNS tunnelling and how these challenges can be surpassed by using
SONs to detect potential attacks.
Chapter 5 This chapter presents and describes an extension of SONs that allows
multiple tokens within the same conditions.
Chapter 6 This chapter provides a plug-in to Load Big Data in Structured Occur-
rence Nets. .
Chapter 7. Concludes the description of research and reflects on its results. The
limitations of the current research and its results are illustrated, along with
several directions for future work and research.
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Visualisation and DNS Background
2.1 Summary
SONs are Petri net based formalism for portraying the behaviour of complex evolving
systems. Their concept is originally grounded on an occurrence net (ON). SONs
provide strong results in terms of the analysis of an evolving system, as the analysis
of the current SONCraft framework reveals.
This chapter will focus on background material as well as the motivation of the
work carried out in this thesis. Section 2.3 focuses on an overview of structured
occurrence nets (SONs) and its features. Section 2.4 discusses the importance of
visualisation, its background, and visualisation techniques. Then we give an overview
of the domain name system (DNS) and discuss DNS tunnelling in Section 2.5. Also, we




SONs [42, 57] are a Petri net based formalism for portraying the behaviour of complex
evolving systems. Their concept is originally grounded on an occurrence net (ON),
which is a directed, acyclic graph illustrating the causality and concurrency informa-
tion concerning a single execution of a given system [42, 57]. Within a SON, multiple
ONs are associated with each other through various types of formal relationships.
They are intended to record information about: (i) the actual or imagined behaviour
of complex systems, as they interact and evolve; and (ii) evidence being gathered
and analysed regarding the past behaviour of complex evolving systems. SONs have
the advantage of supporting various representations of the behaviour of a complex
evolving system [42]. A particularly useful way to use SONs would be as part of a
sophisticated crime or accident investigation support, and at the moment there is
a general lack of investigation support systems based on SONs. The significance of
SONs results from their structuring, as it reduces the complexity when compared to
any other equivalent representation. They also provide a direct means of modelling
behaviour of evolving systems.
This chapter will present SON background information and main features. Firstly,
occurrence nets will be introduced. Afterwards, we will illustrate communication
within SONs, covering both synchronous and asynchronous communication. Then,
the behavioural and temporal dimensions within a SON are discussed. Subsequently,
verification and time in SONs are presented. Finally, the chapter is concluded.
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2.3 Structured Occurrence Nets (SONs)
2.3.1 Occurrence Nets
Occurrence nets (ONs) are acyclic Petri nets which can be used to record dependencies
between states and events in executions of concurrent systems. The main relations
between events in ONs are causality and concurrency. Each occurrence net ON
has three main components: conditions C, events E, and a binary flow relations
F . Conditions and events are the nodes in the graphical representation of ON , and
each flow relation tuple is represented by an arc. In brief, conditions within ON are
linked to events via arcs (the sources are conditions and the destinations are events).
Also, arcs link events to conditions. For a given node x, the set of input nodes is
represented by •x, and the set of output nodes is represented by x•. The initial
state of ON contains the conditions with empty inputs, and the final state consists
of conditions with empty outputs. Regarding ON conditions, each one has at most
one input event, and at most one output event [45]. Moreover, for each event within
ON , there is at least one input condition and at least one output condition. A global
state (or marking) within ON is a maximal set comprising pairwise concurrent (i.e.,
there is no directed path between them) conditions [42]. In general, ONs are cyclic
repetitions for the same events, which is recorded as a new element.
Definition 2.3.1 (ON) An occurrence net is a x triple ON = (C,E, F ), where
C and E are finite disjoint sets of respectively conditions and events (collectively
referred to as the nodes), and F ⊆ (C × E) ∪ (E × C) is the flow relation. The
inputs and outputs of a node x are respectively defined as •x = {y | (y, x) ∈ F} and
x• = {y | (x, y) ∈ F}.1 For a set of nodes X ∈ (C ∪E), we respectively denote by •X
and X• the sets of all inputs and outputs of the nodes in X. It is also assumed that
1In this thesis, sometimes we will, for the purpose of clarity, use the notations pre(x) and post(x)
instead of a ‘dot’ to represent inputs and outputs.
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the following are satisfied:
i. for every condition c there is at most one event e such that (e, c) ∈ F , and at
most one event f such that (c, f) ∈ F ;
ii. for every event e there is at least one condition c such that (c, e) ∈ F , and at
least one condition d such that (e, d) ∈ F ; and;
iii. the relation PreON = (F ◦ F ) |(C×C) is acyclic (in other words, its transitive
closure is irreflexive), and so ON forms an acyclic graph and F+ is a partial
order relation.
A marking (or state) of ON is a set of conditions M . A cut of ON is a maximal set
M such that (M×M)∩F+ = ∅. The initial marking/cut is MON0 = {c ∈ C | •c = ∅},
and the final marking/cut is MONFin = {c ∈ C | c• = ∅}.
A step of ON is a nonempty set of events U such that (•e ∪ e•) ∩ (•f ∪ f •) = ∅,
for all distinct e, f ∈ U .
The execution of ON proceeds by firing sets of events (steps). The next definition
shows conditions under which a marking enables a step and how firing this step
changes the current marking.
Definition 2.3.2 (ON firing rule) Let ON = (C,E, F ) be an occurrence net, M
be a marking, and U be a step of ON .
1. U is ON-enabled at M if •U ⊆M .
2. If U is ON-enabled at M , then U can fire and produce a new marking M ′ given
by M ′ = (M \ •U) ∪ U•.
This is denoted by M [U〉ONM ′.
3. A step sequence is a sequence of steps U1 . . . Uk such that there are markings
M0,M1, . . . ,Mk such that M0 = M
ON
0 and Mi−1[Ui〉ONMi for i = 1, . . . , k.2
2One can show that all the Mi’s are cuts of ON .
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As shown in Figure 2.1, conditions are represented by circles and events by boxes.
The initial marking in this model is {c0} which has a token within the starting
condition. Five cuts are present in this model, namely: {c1, c2}, {c1, c4}, {c3, c4},
{c2, c3}, and {c5}. A possible step sequence is y = {e0}{e1, e2}{e3}. This marking
sequence starts at M0 = {c0} and finishes with {c5}.
Figure 2.1: An occurrence net.
A phase of ON is a non-empty set of conditions π ⊆ C such that the set Minπ ⊆ π
of the minimal conditions of π (w.r.t. F+) is a cut; the set Maxπ ⊆ π of the maximal
conditions of π (w.r.t. F+) is a cut; and π comprises all conditions c ∈ C for which
there are b ∈ Minπ and d ∈ Maxπ satisfying (b, c) ∈ F ∗ and (c, d) ∈ F ∗. Moreover,
a phase decomposition of ON is a sequence π1 . . . πm of phases of ON such that
MON0 = Minπ1 , Maxπi = Minπi+1 (for i ≤ m − 1), and Maxπm = MONFin . A block of
ON is a non-empty set B ∈ (C ∪ E) such that B ∩ C = •(B ∩ E) ∩ (B ∩ E)• and
(•B \B)× (B• \B) ⊆ F ∗ [60, 45].
Each phase is a fragment of ON beginning with a cut and ending with a cut
which follows it in the causal sense, including all the conditions occurring between
these cuts. A phase decomposition is a sequence of phases from the initial cut to the
final cut, and whenever one phase ends, its maximal cut is the starting point of the
successive one (minimal cut) [45, 60]. A block represents a contiguous fragment of
activity within the behaviour represented by ON . Intuitively, a block is a set of nodes
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in which all conditions are internal to the block, that is, the input and output events
of each condition must belong to the block; and all block ending events are causally
linked to all starting events. Note that a single event can constitute a block [45, 60].
Figure 2.2: A phase decomposition of an occurrence net.
Occurrence nets describe causality and concurrency relations between events.
There is also the possibility to derive occurrence nets from historical data such as
log files, so as to directly illustrate a system’s execution history [60]. ON mod-
elling can represent computing systems and their histories, but they can also include
components and systems involving people and even natural processes, such as crime
investigations or cybercrime scenarios.
2.3.2 Communication Structured Occurrence Nets
There are two types of abstract relations which show communications between dif-
ferent ON subsystems. Communication within SONs is explained [42, 45] through
separate occurrence nets (ONs); these proceed concurrently and occasionally com-
municate with each other. For instance, systems can be represented as sets of ON
components, i.e., each ON is a subsystem, interacting with each other. The events
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in each separate ON are responsible for associations between ONs; these associations
usually occur via a special element called channel place. Communication in SONs is
of two types: asynchronous and synchronous [42, 45].
Figure 2.3 shows a communication structured occurrence net cson which consists
of two occurrence nets, namely ON1 and ON2. Asynchronous communication which
is represented through the dashed arc between two events in different ONs, e.g., e0
and e2.
Figure 2.3: Asynchronous and synchronous communication.
The second type of communication within SONs is synchronous communication
which is represented by the arcs between events e1 and e3 via channel places q1 and q2
[42, 45]. Thus, in any execution consistent with the causal relationships captured by
(CSON), e0 will never be executed after e2, although the two events can be executed
simultaneously, whereas e1 and e3 will always be executed simultaneously. SONs are
underpinned by causal structures which extend causal partial orders with additional
ordering, called weak causality. Two events ordered in this way can be executed in
the order given or simultaneously. Moreover, if two events are weakly ordered in
both directions (this means, in particular, that weak causality is not assumed to be
acyclic), then they can only be executed simultaneously. In SONs, weak causality
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results from passing tokens through channel places, whereas the non-channel places
introduce the standard causality, as in ONs. In Figure 2.3, e0 weakly causes e2, and
the events e1 and e3 form a weak causality cycle.
Definition 2.3.3 (CSON) A communication structured occurrence net [45, 60] (cson)
is a tuple
cson = (ON1, . . . , ONk, Q,W )





i=1Ei and F =
⋃k
i=1 Fi their conditions, events and arcs); Q is
a set of channel places; and W ⊆ (E×Q)∪ (Q×E) are the arcs between the channel
places and events. It is further assumed that:
1. The ONi’s and Q are mutually disjoint.
2. The sets of input and output events of q ∈ Q,
•q = {e ∈ E | (e, q) ∈ W} and q• = {e ∈ E | (q, e) ∈ W} ,
belong to distinct component ONi’s; and moreover, |•q| = 1 and |q•| ≤ 1.
3. The relation
(@ ∪ ≺)∗◦ ≺ ◦(≺ ∪ @)∗ (2.1)
over E is irreflexive, where:
• e ≺ f if there is c ∈ C with c ∈ e• ∩ •f ;
• e @ f if there is q ∈ Q with q ∈ e• ∩ •f .
In Definition 2.3.3(2.1), we use the relation @ (weak causality) to represent a/syn-
chronous communication between two events (see [40, 27]). Intuitively, the original
causality relation ≺ represents the ‘earlier than’ relationship of the events, and @
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represents the ‘not later than’ relationship. The input and output sets of a node in a
cson are also extended to include channel places with the relation W . In order to en-
sure that the resulting causal dependencies remain consistent, in Definition 2.3.3(2.1)
we require more than the acyclicity of each component occurrence net, by stipulating
that in the graph of the relation @ ∪ ≺ there is no cycle involving ≺. In other words,
the only cycles which can be present are cycles involving @ but not ≺.
The initial marking Mcson0 of a cson is the union of M
ON1
0 , . . . ,M
ONk
0 (assuming
that there are no channel places in Mcson0 ). The final marking M
cson
Fin of a cson is
the union of MON1Fin , . . . ,M
ONk
Fin . In general, a marking in a cson is a set of conditions
and channel places. A step in a cson is the union of a set of steps which may come
from one of more component occurrence nets [45, 60].
Definition 2.3.4 (CSON firing rule) Let cson be a communication structured oc-
currence net as in Definition 2.3.3, M be a marking, and U be a step of the cson.
1. U is cson-enabled at M if (•U \ U•) ⊆M .
2. If U is cson-enabled at M , then U can be fired and produce a new marking M ′
given by: M ′ = (M ∪ U•) \ •U . This is denoted by M [U〉csonM ′.
The step sequences and reachable markings of cson are then defined similarly as
for an occurrence net.
The firing rule above means that a step U involving synchronous behaviour can use
not only the tokens that are already available in channel places at marking M , but also
can use the tokens deposited there by events from step U during the execution of U .
In this way, events from step U can ‘help’ each other individually and synchronously
pass resources (tokens) among themselves. Thus, in contrast to the step sequence of
an occurrence net, where a step consists of a number of enabled events, the execution
of a step in a cson (i.e. M [U〉M ′) may involve synchronous communications, where
events execute simultaneously and behave as a transaction. Such a mode of execution
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provides possibility to execute multiple events in a single step, and therefore is more
expressive than that used in ONs.
2.3.3 Behavioural Structured Occurrence Nets (BSONs
Behavioural Structured Occurrence Nets (BSONs) are used [42] to model the activities
of an evolving system. There are two designated levels which represent an execution
history: the lower level for representing behavioural details, and the upper level, which
represents the different stages of evolution [60]. Thus, a BSON provides information
about the evolution of an individual system. The overall activity phases are used to
represent each successive stage of the evolution of this system [42]. For example, as
illustrated in Figure 2.4, one level can represent what has occurred in terms of the
specific system and its evolution, while the other reveals the behaviour of the systems.
In other words, it is correct to state that the former can be viewed as the behavioural
abstraction of the latter [42].
Figure 2.4: Behavioural Structured Occurrence Nets.
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2.3.3.1 Synchronous Cycles and Asynchronous Cycles
Figure 2.5: Using SONs features in a crime scenario.
In the next example of a crime case, the asynchronous and synchronous communica-
tion are used to show how these features help us to model a complicated example. As
presented in Figure 2.5, the SON framework can be applied on crime scenarios. The
figure illustrates how SON can be used in order to visualise different levels within
crime scenarios. This particular model presents five occurrence nets or ONs. Each
ON constitutes the behaviour within a sub-scenario. For instance, the individual
behaviour of two thieves is represented by three ONs: for Thief 1, Thief 2 and the
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House scene. The first ON represents how Thief 1 switched off the power of the house
in order to steal from within. The second ON illustrates how Thief 2 cleared the gate
by killing the guard dog. Finally, the House scene illustrates the crime scene after
the thieves cut the power and cleared the gate. Behavioural relationships are used
to hold dependencies between “Power Switch” and “Thief 1”, also between “Secure
Gate” and “Thief 2”. Thus, there is a clear asynchronous interaction between two
different ONs, i.e. Thief 1 and the House scene, as well as between Thief 2 and the
House scene. This interaction illustrates causal relationships between the three dif-
ferent scenarios. As we can see in Figure 2.5 there are several, such as communication
between ON(Thief 1) and ON(House scene) as well as synchronous communication
between ON(House scene) and ON(Thief 2).
2.3.4 Temporal Structured Occurrence Nets
Atomicity has long been recognised as important concept in distributed and concur-
rent systems. Many research projects focused on this concept from the perspective of
both theory and practice. For instance, [5] models atomicity in asynchronous systems,
and [62] focused on how to use atomicity in terms of designing applications. A rea-
sonable way of using atomicity usually leads to reducing the complexity of structured
system behaviours. This happens when the detailed system description is hidden, and
more abstract view is represented at an upper level simply and clearly. As a result,
this can help in the efficient analysis of particular behaviour. For instance, if there
is a complicated problem that we need to represent, then the upper level will have
simple details, and these details can be abstraction of extensive details at the lower
level.
Temporal SONs (TSONs) use the notion of a block to ‘abbreviate’ parts of occur-
rence net representing atomic actions. Figure 2.6(a) represents the abbreviation of a
system using the upper ON, so that the low level view of the behaviour is hidden by
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the temporal abstraction [42, 45]. Figure 2.6(b,c) show alternative representations of
Figure 2.6(a), where the collapsed behaviour part is replaced by simple events [42, 45].
Ts,lDlTs,uTf,lTf,uDtimeTsTfDu
Figure 2.6: Temporal Structured Occurrence Net.
2.3.5 Time in SONs
In order to analyse and investigate crime scenarios in effective way, the order of event
occurrences is very important [46]. Moreover, to determine causes and effects of events
it is very useful to obtain their durations. Time in SONs may help to detect suspects
and estimate the time of a crime event. Timed structured occurrence nets (Timed
SONs) [46] can be used in the analyses and modelling of causality by relating events
that have uncertain timing information [46]. Timed SONs can be used in various
cases such as crime and accident investigations [6].
For example, the global discrete time can support consistent casual reasoning of
a particular system. Moreover, time intervals can be used to capture missed time
information. In [46], each node of a SON has start time Ts and finish time Tf . Also,
for each time value there is a bounded uncertainty. They are represented by a specified
time interval: [Ts,l, Ts,u] and [Tf,l, Tf,u], respectively. In [46] each node (i.e. condition,
event or channel place) has a duration D with bounded uncertainty represented by a









Figure 2.7: Time in SON.
2.4 SONS and Alternative Modelling Techniques
2.4.1 Attack Graphs
Attack Graphs provide a graphical representation of scenarios of attack. In graph
theory, a tree is an acyclic graph that connects any two vertices through one path.
Also, in general, the visual representations of a decision tree, an event tree, an attack
tree, and an occurrence net use an acyclic graph. Attack graphs are visualised and
represented through both cyclic and acyclic graphs. Attack Graphs were introduced
in 1998 by Phillips and Swiler [54]. After that, attack graphs became a popular rep-
resentation for attack analysis, starting with [25]. They can be used to detect attacks
and defend against them, and also perform forensic analysis. Moreover, attack graphs
can be used to analyse the effectiveness of offline detection systems [25]. Attack graphs
have been used to model, visualise, and analyse sequences of events of cyber-attacks
in computers, networks, and cyberspace. Consequently, they can help the decision-
maker to identify security problem in systems [44]. However, attack graphs and attack
trees suffer from a distinct lack of standards, prescriptive methodologies, and com-
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mon approaches in terms of visualisation [44]. Also, although properly representing
preconditions to identify cyber-attacks in terms of mitigation and countermeasures is
essential, there is a lack of attack graphs that provide such preconditions [44]. There
are several types of attack graphs, for example, the generic attack graphs, the alert
correlation graphs, the vulnerability graphs, the miscellaneous attack graphs, and the
dependency graphs.
2.4.2 SON vs ML vs Attack Graph
In this section, we will discuss the differences between SON and machine learning in
terms of dealing with big data. Before diving deeper into this topic, we first need
to define machine learning. After that, we focus on presenting the challenges of
dealing with big data in machine learning and SONs. The machine learning (ML)
algorithms and techniques have been developed to extract useful and meaningful
information from different sources by using training and validating labeled data sets.
There are several challenges and issues when ML deals with big data sets. The
major problem [65] is that, when the ML technique is trained on a particular data
set or data domain, then it is only suitable for this data set or domain; however,
it may not be suitable for solving other big data sets. Another issue with an ML
technique is that it usually uses a different number of class types, by which we mean
a larger variety of class types that are found in the dynamic growing data set which
causes inaccurate classification results [65]. Furthermore, an additional challenge is
that ML techniques have been developed to rely on learning one task at a time.
As a result, these techniques are not suitable for multitask learning and knowledge
transfer that today’s Big Data analytic require. Moreover, dealing with big data in
real-time scenarios is still a challenge in ML [65], because dealing with such situations
requires constant user interaction. On the other hand, SONs can deal with large data
set using features like causality and concurrency. However, SONs are still in their
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infancy when it comes to dealing with large data sets. We have investigated this
problem and provided a SON algorithm dealing with large data sets. However, SONs
need to be improved in terms of dealing with big data. For instance, research on
SONs should aim to improve the visualisation of big data, by combining it with other
technologies such as Hadoop, Neo4j, and NLP (Natural Language Processing).
This comparison leads to an important conclusion that a major difference between
SONs, ML, Attack Graphs, and general Petri nets is that the structuring and abstrac-
tion mechanisms in SONs (such as the behavioural abstraction) are not supported
by the other frameworks. In addition, Attack Graphs and (in particular) ML do not
provide an explicit representation of causality and concurrency as SONs do.
2.5 Visualisation
In this section we will focus on the background of visualisation and its importance.
In addition, it will review visualisation methods and techniques.
The goal of visualisation, as defined by [64, 39, 36, 72], is to help the researcher
or the decision maker to easily identify insights which result from data. Visualisation
helps to present the respective data in a suitable and understandable manner. For [68],
visualisation represents the best way to convey complicated ideas clearly, precisely
and efficiently. These kind of graphical representations are understandable and easy
to explain. The aim of visualisation is to generate useful insight from large amounts of
data. In addition, visualisation also helps to analyse, discover and clarify information
while placing it into an understandable form. The main purpose of using visualisation
is given by the need to synthesize and present a large amount of data, often from
different sources and viewpoints, with the purpose of describing different levels of
detail [50]. Visualisation relies on data discovery methods which help users to combine
different data sources to create new analytical views.
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2.5.1 Importance of visualisation
Discovering relevant meaning from figures, images and presentations is generally easier
than from other forms of information [68]. As such, visualisation is not only a way to
provide information and present it, but also a suitable means of communication [50].
Today, visualisation can help in different ways. For instance, high velocity, enhanced
optimisation and significant impact lead to insight discovery [38]. All these points are
ultimately used as a support by both decision makers and researchers. Visualisation
data [15] is a main key of the discovery process when operating with big data sets.
Moreover, visualisation is important for extracting knowledge and understanding and
recognising interesting patterns. It also serves to identify correlations and outliers.
As a result, visualisation is able to provide a plethora of techniques which can help
to understand and analyse evolving data.
2.5.2 Visualisation stages
Visualisation occurs in four stages [69], as illustrated in Figure 2.8 below:
Figure 2.8: Visualisation process [69].
Step 1: Data collection and storage.
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Step 2: Preprocessing: in this stage, data is transformed to be easy to operate and
understand.
Step 3: Using algorithms which produce and present data into the computer as an
image.
Step 4: The human perceptual and cognitive system [69].
2.5.3 Visualisation techniques
Considering the importance of visualisation today, in most cases, simply presenting
information is not enough. During the last decades, various data visualisation tech-
niques have been elaborated. As a result, visualisation achieved a considerable level
of development. This makes it possible to deal with huge amounts of data in an ef-
ficient manner. In addition, new, different methods of data visualisation appear and
are being developed constantly. These different visualisation techniques are helpful
to conduct research in information science. Crime investigators and decision makers
in government also rely on it to gain insights. Moreover, it is important to harness
advantages such as human cognitive capacities in order to achieve even more accu-
rate results [47]. This section reviews several of the most important visualisation
techniques. In addition, the well-known principle of usability is brought into the dis-
cussion.
Types of interaction techniques
Visualisation techniques [47] are classified into the following two main categories:
1. Technical Approach (data structures oriented).
2. Interactive approach (user oriented).
The following section describes these two different types of visualisation. Each is
defined and illustrated with examples.
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2.5.3.1 Technical Approach
This subsection focuses on different data structuring, the first of which are linear data
exploits. Several visualisation techniques are included here:
a) Timeline technique. This technique allows users to follow temporal events from
different points of view. It can be defined as a graphical representation which
helps to illustrate a given list of events in the chronological order in which they
occurred. This technique presents each object as an event line which shows
the start time and end time of each event [56]. Moreover, the values which are
attributed on the timeline illustrate how they changed over time. In addition, it
supports queries and filtering [23]. The timeline technique allows users to easily
recognise whether there are any particular patterns which could be shown in
any particular time. Also, the technique helps to illustrate how different events
can be distributed during different time periods.
b) Using data tables which allow users to visualise a large set of data in a table
form [55]. This technique provides an overview, filters details and can easily
recognise if there are any relationships between objectives. However, this tech-
nique presents a challenge, namely it cannot extract the valuable data only by
identifying it [47].
The second technique is multidimensional data. This technique has been used to
reduce the number of dimensions to two or three, with the purpose of making it
easier to translate and analyse the data. There are two types of multidimensional
data techniques:
1. Scatterplots which showcase data through groups of dots [19]. It is suitable for
filtering information. However, the multi points cause difficulty when reading
the data [47].
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2. The polyline system, which is used to represent each object of the base by poly-
line with a number of data dimensions within the system [47]. Data dimensions
are represented in each axis. The most well-known techniques are called parallel
coordinates [26]. These techniques allow the user to visualise many dimensions
at same time [47]. Through it, model tendencies and correlations can be estab-
lished. This type of visualisation is useful to discover any phenomenon which
is otherwise hard to detect [47]. However, the main lacking of this technique
is that it is important to exploit all parameters in order to detect all views.
The third data structuring technique is that of hierarchies. In this technique,
data is hierarchically organised through a tree structure which links parent and
child nodes such as graphs and trees. This technique is suitable for information
visualisation because it is clear and simple for users. Moreover, when compared
with other visualisation techniques, it provides the benefit of swift testing and
diversity [61]. There are several different types of hierarchy techniques:
a) Metrics-wise [20]. It includes Boolean metrics which have false values by de-
fault. In each tuple in the graph, the line and the column which are intersected
both have true value [20] shows that this technique can detect the underlying
structure of the graph. Moreover, we can use this technique to identify models
in space. The technique is also useful for data mining [47]. However, through
this technique it is difficult to visualise many binary relations within one matrix.
In this technique, data is set in a list.
b) The Tree Map is used to represent hierarchical data within a form. In other
words, the technique is used to represent hierarchical structures [29]. It allows
the user to easily compare different nodes at different depths. Also, it helps to
redefine and find new patterns.
c) The Cone Tree is another type of technique which helps to visualise hierarchical
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data in three dimensions. It is named as such because its branches expand in the
form of a cone [8]. It also possesses an attractive overview. The base consists of
notes which are the top of the cone. In addition, sub-cones are formed around
the base, in a circular fashion. It can take either a vertical or horizontal form [8].
The fourth technical approach technique consists of Networks. It is a graphical vi-
sualisation of the logical relationship between different aspects. It generates a direct
graph and combines nodes, edges and arcs. In each arc there is a label. The nodes
represent concepts, and the arcs represent relationships.
2.5.3.2 Interaction techniques
Any system which visualises information has two main components, namely repre-
sentation and interaction [71]. The representation component is situated in the field
of computer graphics, which is responsible to for the mapping process, from data to
representation. However, the other component is interaction, which is accountable
for the interchange of information between users and systems, so that the users can
discover varieties of the overall data set to get insights [47]. Moreover, interaction
components are found in human computer interaction (HCI). It is a challenge to pro-
vide a clear definition of interaction in visualisation, defined as “the communication
between users and the system” [12]. However, interaction techniques are easier to de-
fine and indeed a more tangible concept than interaction. Interaction techniques are
designed to change and adjust visual representation instead of just entering data into
systems [12]. Moreover [71], interaction techniques act as features which allow the
user to translate and manipulate representations either directly or indirectly. Also,
interaction techniques can improve user perception of information during working
with a particular data sets [22]. The main advantage of interaction is that it offers
the ability to interact with visual representations. In so doing, it can deal with over-
lapping objects and visual mess, especially when dealing with large data sets. As a
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result, it is a technique which is able to handle complexity in such issues, namely
overlapping objects and visual mess [12]. These techniques had been developed by
Keim [36], who classified them into several main categories.
1. Distortion Techniques
This technique helps the process of data exploration by focusing on details while
preserving the general data overview [37]. The main idea of distortion tech-
niques is that they display part of the data with high level of details, while at the
same time displaying the parts which have a low level of details. In [36], Keim
distinguishes between dynamic and interactive distortion techniques, which ul-
timately change if visualisation is made automatically or manually.
2. Dynamic Projections
The main idea of this technique is that the change to projections are made
dynamically, with the purpose of discovering multidimensional data sets [37].
The disadvantage of this kind of technique is that it is difficult to operate data
sets.
3. Interactive Filtering
This type of technique is suitable for large data sets because it divides the
respective data sets into segments, making it easier to focus on the interesting
sets [37]. This process can done by directly browsing each particular subset,
or by specifying the properties of each particular subset. However, browsing is
difficult when operating with large data sets and also querying may not provide
the desired effect [36]. As a result, there are a several interaction techniques
which have improved the interactive filtering to boost data exploration. For
example, Magic Lenses which use a magnifying glass tool which supports data
filtering within the visualisation. Moreover, data operate under the magnifying
glass tool and can be filtered, meaning that the resulting data will be represented
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differently [36]. Magic Lenses shows the modified data view which the user has
selected, while the general visualisation remains unaffected. Different lenses
with different types of filters are available and can be used in Magic Lenses.
4. Interactive Zooming
The zooming technique has been widely used in practice and is a well-known
technique. It is typically used when operating with large data sets. Fur-
thermore, it allows data to be visualised as compressed, to display the data
overview [36]. However, it also allows data to be displayed in different resolu-
tions. Additionally, although it is used to show the data in a large view, it is
also used to automatically visualise any changes to the data. Furthermore, it
allows that view to be expanded, so as to allow the user to view more details
on a high level zoom. For example, objects are displayed as pixels within a low
level zoom, as icons on an intermediate zoom level, and as labelled objects at a
high level.
5. Interactive Linking and Brushing
In this technique, different visualisation methods have been combined to make
up for the disadvantages of other visualisation techniques. For example, scat-
terplots of different projections can be combined by colouring and linking each
subset of points and all projections [36]. Moreover, connecting different visual-
isation techniques by interactive linking and brushing provides more details on
independent information [36].
2.6 Domain Name System (DNS)
A DNS or Domain Name System assigns domain names and then maps each of them in
accordance with the existing name servers, which host each respective domain [51]. At
the same time, due to various reasons, network administrators are allowed to delegate
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authority over some sub-domains of a given name space to other name servers. This
permission was given so that the existence of a single, large, centralised database
would not occur; at the same time, the resulting services are fault-tolerant [51].
Additionally, DNS also defines the technical parameters of each database service
which is situated at its core. These parameters are part of what is known as the
DNS protocol, meaning a detailed specification of both the data structures within
the DNS, as well as communication between these various structures. Both these
elements make up the Internet Protocol Suite. As a broad rule, two main name spaces
are maintained across the internet, namely name hierarchy [51] and IP or Internet
Protocol address spaces. DNS accomplishes two tasks: on one hand, it ensures the
domain name hierarchy is kept, while providing translation services between it and a
given address space, on the other hand. To function properly, DNS relies on multiple
servers as well as on a communication protocol. Records for a specific domain are
stored on a particular type of DNS server called a DNS name server; it answers to
queries addressed to databases within it. Once a user types in any web address in
the browser, for instance www.google.com, the current, local DNS server (resolver)
will check whether or not the address is stored within it and then sends a response
to the user, with the IP address of that particular website. However, if the resolver
does not recognise that domain, it will send the query to the DNS root name server.
As a result, the DNS root server will send a response back to the resolver, telling
it the domain name (google.com) belongs to name server for .com top-level domain
(LTD). Afterwards, the resolver will send the query to the DNS server google.com,
asking about the IP address of www.google.com. As a result, the .com name server
will respond with an IP address for google and the resolver will receive it and open
the website for the user [51]. Figure 2.9 illustrates this process.
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Figure 2.9: How DNS Resolves Names and IP Addresses (the labels on arcs indicate
successive steps of DNS protocol).
2.6.1 Name servers
The maintenance of Domain Name Systems is ensured through distributed database
systems, which use client - server models. In these cases, database nodes consist of
name servers. At the same time, for each existing domain, one or more given DNS
servers provide data concerning the respective domain and the servers of domains
which are subsequent to that respective domain. At the top of this hierarchy, we find
root name servers, which typically receive queries when a LTD must be solved [30, 34].
2.6.2 Location transparency
Location transparency helps to identify existing an network resources, through names,
rather than through location [51, 30]. For instance, a user gains access through a
unique file; however, actual data is reserved in sectors which are dispersed either
across the network or within a local computer. Within such a system, the actual
location of a file is not relevant to the user; however, a distributed system is required,
so as to ensure a naming scheme for the available resources. One of the essential
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gains of using location transparency is that location is indeed irrelevant. Considering
the given network setup, a user can obtain files from any computer connected to the
network. As such, the actual location of a given resource does not matter anymore,
thus creating the impression that the whole ensemble is accessible from any computer
terminal, further boosting software upgrades [51]. Using location transparency also
provides considerable versatility. This means system resources can be shifted from
one computer to another, within the network, without disrupting the network. Simply
updating the location of a given resource is enough, as all programs using that specific
resource will be able to find it [51]. In a nutshell, location transparency is highly user
friendly, as data is accessible to everyone who connects to the internet and who knows
the name of the file or files and who has the required clearance to access it.
2.6.3 DNS records
The DNS protocol typically uses multiple record types for various purposes. The
most common type of such records is A, which essentially switches domain names
into IP addresses. For example, AAAA records accomplish a similar role for IPv6
protocols. Other record types, such as CNAME, are known as aliases. This type
of record directs towards another defined domain name, but never towards an IP
address. At the same time, one IP address can have several domain names or aliases.
NS stands for NameServer; it keeps the address of the authoritative NameServer
which can resolve any sub-domains for that.
2.6.4 DNS Tunnelling
DNS tunnelling is a covert communication channel, which allows encapsulating the
traffic of other protocols (E.g.: HTTP, Telnet, FTP, SSH, etc.) within DNS packets.
This results in concealing the real protocol by making the traffic look like ordinary
DNS traffic. DNS tunnelling is very suitable to be used for malicious activities such
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as data exfiltration as well as command and control call-backs from within restricted
internal networks. Different from other tunnelling methods such as SSH Tunnelling,
a distinctive property of DNS Tunnelling is that, it uses the legitimate DNS servers
of the internal network to hop its packet through, to reach the final destination,
which is the attacker-controlled server DNS Tunnelling encapsulates the data in DNS
queries and responses. In this way, the outer protocol remains as DNS; however, the
encapsulated data payload belongs to another protocol [30].
Figure 2.10: DNS tunnelling.
Figure 2.10 explains how DNS tunnelling is performed. The powerful advantage
of DNS tunnelling is that, if a compromised computer is trying to send “secret” data
to the attacker-controlled server on the external network (the Internet), even if such
direct communications get blocked by the network firewall, DNS Tunnelling would
bypass this restriction. The compromised computer would send the secret data within
a Base64-encoded message, for example “c2VJcmV0”. It will send the query to the
internal DNS server, to ask the corresponding IP address, in the form of a basic
DNS query for c2VJcmV0.talalncl.com. The internal DNS server would forward this
DNS query to the authoritative DNS server for the DNS Zone “talalncl.com”. Since
the authoritative DNS server is actually the attacker-controlled external server, the
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message gets delivered to its destination. The talalncl.com DNS server will then
respond and return a dummy answer, such as 127.0.0.1. Afterwards, the talalncl.com
DNS server will analyse the query as follows:
c2VjcmV0.talalncl.com
Base64Decode
c2VjcmV0 − > secret which means the data extracted from within the DNS
query.
Finally, a single message within DNS tunnelling looks normal. This message may look
exactly like a normal DNS query. This is actually the weakness of DNS Tunnelling:
although a single packet may look like a normal DNS query, thousands of queries for
sub-domains within the same domain will help to detect the DNS tunnel.
2.6.5 Existing Detect DNS Tunnelling
There are several techniques that can be used to detect DNS tunnelling. The next
table shows that.
2.6.5.1 Traffic Analysis
1. The volume of DNS traffic per IP address
One way to detect DNS tunnelling using traffic analysis methods is to look at
the traffic that a specific IP address generates (Pietraszek, 2004). The technique
works based on the fact that each request of tunnelled data is up to 512 bytes,
therefore, a complete communication will require one to send many requests
(Van Horenbeeck, 2006). A server will send the request continuously if the
client is polling the server.
2. The volume of DNS traffic per domain
The other fundamental method of detecting DNS tunnelling involves looking at
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the amount of traffic to a particular domain. Because utilities are designed to
tunnel data through a specific domain name, this method can be used to detect
possibility of DNS tunnelling (Butler, 2011). However, if DNS tunnelling is
configured with multiple domain names, each domain receives less amount of
traffic.
3. Number of Hostnames per Domain
Guy (2009) suggests that number of hostnames per domains may indicate pos-
sibility of DNS tunnelling. In DNS tunnelling utilities each request has a unique
hostname, which means that there will be a large number of hostnames com-
pared to a legitimate domain name. However, this method can be sophisticated
to determine an optimal threshold since various methods of tunnelling varies
when it comes how many hostnames it has.
4. The DNS Server Geographic Location
Another factor to consider when determining DNS tunnelling is where the DNS
server is located geographically. If a given location where a DNS server is
receives of sends significant amount of traffic, this may be an indication that
there is DNS tunnelling in that part or parts of the world (Skoudis, 2012). This
method may be of help for organizations that do not have businesses in the
international markets.
5. Domain history
Domain history can help to detect DNS tunnelling, as it can raise suspicion
on DNS traffic. Domain history is used to detect tunnelling by determining
when A or NS records were added since a domain may have been acquired not
long ago for DNS tunnelling, meaning that its NS was added recently (Zrdnja,
2007). The method can be used to detect the domain that has been involved
in malicious activities.
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6. Volume of NXDomain responses
DGA generated names can be detected by looking for excessive NXDomain
responses (Antonakakis, 2012). The volume of NXDomain can be useful when
one needs to detect Heyoka, which is capable of generating a large amount of
NXDomain responses.
7. Visualisation
Vsualization may be used to detect DNS tunnelling Guy, 2009). Visualiza-
tion involves interactive work done by an analyst; however, tunnelled traffic is
noticeable.
8. Orphan DNS requests
Most of the methods used to detect DNS tunnelling looks for visible evidence
of tunnelling, however, other approaches may look for what is missing or what
one expects to see. When it comes to general computing, a DNS request follows
another request done previously, for instance, a DNS request for a web page will
follow HTTP request. Orphan DNS requests lack consistent requests coming
from a different application for instance http and some exceptions will be easily
filtered out. Some security devices stores the process of retrieving information
by a given IP address while DNS requests are used in anti-spam solutions to
locate backlisted IP addresses. To check the reputation of the suspicious file,
endpoint security makes use of DNS requests with encrypted file hash that is
rooted in the fully qualified domain name (FQDN).
9. The general covert channel detection
Research has addressed various techniques for covert channel detection that are
not associated with the protocol (Couture, 2010). One may use utilities set up
to detect tunnel by looking at things such as request time or even to compare
traffic to a statistical fingerprint.
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2.6.5.2 Payload Analysis
1. Request and Response Size
Analysing the size of the request and response is one payload analysis technique
used to detect tunnelling. According to Bianco (2006), the source byte to
destination byte ratio can be used as a method of identifying suspicious DNS
tunnelling traffic. MySQL database stored data as part of Squall or Snort
systems is requested to determine the destination and source bytes. Then, one
compares the source byte to destination byte ratio with the limit value. Because
DNS tunnelling unities attempt to feed as much data into the request as possible,
it is possible that tunnelling request will contain ling labels up to 63 characters
as well as ling overall names which are up to 255 characters long. Looking for
hostname requests that are longer than 52 characters may be another method
of detecting DNS tunnelling (Guy, 2009).
2. Entropy of hostnames DNS names that are genuine are made up of dictio-
nary words or something else that looks meaningful. However, DNS names that
are not legitimate are unpredictable and tend to use more character sets. How-
ever, cases where DNS names represent some type of information, for instance,
content delivery networks, can be excluded. Therefore, DNS names with high
entropy are an indicator of DNS tunnelling.
3. Statistical Analysis Another technique of determining DNS tunnelling is to
observe the frequency at which specific characters in DNS name occur. While
genuine DNS names have few numbers, encoded DNS names tend to contain a
lot of numbers. Another proposed methodology is to look at the proportion of
specific letterings in the domain name (Bilge, 2011). Another character based
method of detecting tunnelling is to consider the proportion of the Longest
Meaningful Substring (LMS) method (Bilge, 2011). One can also look at the
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number of unique characters, and alert on anything that has over 27 unique
characters (Guy, 2009). It is possible to detect names generated using DNS
tunnelling considering the fact that genuine names mirror common language to
a given degree. Another statistical analysis method of detecting DNS tunnelling
is to look for repeated consonant and numbers. It is common for tunnelling
utility to create names with consecutive number and consonants unlikely to be
seen in domain names mirroring common languages (Lockington, 2012).
4. Uncommon Record Types This method involves analysing record to find
those that typical clients do not use regularly. These uncommonly used record
types can be used to detect DNS tunnelling. Record types such as TXT are
rarely used (Pietraszek, 2004), and if one identifies them, he or she can detect
tunnelling of DNS.
5. Policy Violation In some cases, all DNS requires a specific policy just like it
all DNS is required to pass through an internal DNS server. Therefore, in case
there is a violation of this policy, it will be a good indicator of DNS tunnelling.
This method requires monitoring the DNS requests directly to the internet (Fry,
2009). It is important to note that most of DNS tunnelling utilities are designed
in a way that they can work even as they forward request through a DNS server
that is internal.
6. Specific Signatures Researchers and authors recommended the use of a par-
ticular signature of the DNS tunnelling names. Most of the DNS tools have
DNS names with particular signature or patterns. A signature can help on
checking particular attributed in a DNS header as well as checking for particu-
lar content in the payload. For instance, there is a methodology that has been




In this chapter, different background areas have been reviewed and discussed. Also,
the motivation behind this project has presented. Moreover, an overview of structured
occurrence nets (SONs) and its features have presented. Also, we have provided the
SON features with its definitions. For instance, communication in SON (CSON) and
provide examples that show how these communications occurred. Moreover, we have
discussed the domain name system (DNS) and review the methods of detection that
DNS tunnelling. After reviewing and investigating this matter, we have come with
next result. During the review of the existing DNS tunnelling detection, there were
many detections methods. Many rely on traffic analysis, such as the volume of DNS
traffic per IP address, the volume of DNS traffic per domain, and so on. However,
(Guy, 2009) suggests visualisation as a method to detect DNS tunnelling; however,
it argues that the tunnelled traffic stands out dramatically. Compare this with our
solution in chapter 4, the feature of structured occurrence net allows us to deal with
this issue in a proper way. I mean in term of visualising the data in SON can give a
away to detect DNS. Other methods to detect the DNS tunnelling rely on statistics.
However, our approach is to create a new algorithm that detects DNS tunnelling by
modelling DNS packets whether that normal or abnormal packets and our algorithm
will distinguish the abnormal and detect it, see section 6 in chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
Visualising Data Sets in Structured
Occurrence Nets
3.1 Summary
Visualisation techniques have been used with increasing success to assist users in
complex system analyses, providing meaningful insights. Visualisation of SONs in
tools such as SONCraft is currently limited, as there is a lack of effective support
to visualise complex and large data sets. In this chapter, we address challenges
resulting from the overlapping and out-of-order placement of ONs, and propose a novel
solution to deal with this issue based on a step execution policy. Also, we discuss the
development of the resulting algorithm, and SONCraft plug-in implementing it. In
this chapter we proceed as follows.The next sections 3.3 and 3.4 discusses visualisation
challenges related to SONs in SONCraft. In Section 3.5 we propose a novel solution
to deal with them based on maximal concurrency. Section 3.6 describes the policy-
driven visualisation algorithm. Section 3.7 describes implementation and results. The
last section 3.9 contains concluding remarks.
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3.2 Introduction
Complex and large data sets drive considerable attention from information science
researchers, crime investigators, and decision makers within governments. Tremen-
dous growth of this kind of data tends to transform its analysis into a hard process.
The existence of such data provides important insights, but also raises challenges. In
particular, visualisation techniques have been used with increasing success to assist
users in various analyses, and providing valuable insights about system structure and
behaviour [32, 63].
Although SONs are supported by visualisation in tools such as SONCraft [46, 45]
there are currently limitations as one cannot effectively visualise data sets automati-
cally. Our aim is to enhance SONCraft making it possible to visualise big data sets in
an helpful and understandable way. The approach we propose is to use semantically
driven visualisation which adopts maximal concurrency (a step execution policy in
the sense of [9]) to provide structured displays. As a result, the new approach should
lead to effective display of complex SONs.
3.3 Policy Driven Visualisation
The current section evaluates SONCraft from the perspective of interaction tech-
niques, as there are issues to be expected when inputting data to SONCraft, after
allowing the tool to accept data sets automatically. Such issues include the overlap-
ping of ONs. They can be addressed by using the concept of maximal concurrency,
which is a step execution policy in the sense of [9]. Concerning the implementation of
new visualisation techniques, they deal with the two main purposes of data analysis,
namely understanding and exploration. The aim of exploration in data analysis is to
find a perspective which has not been previously discovered. A good example is a
crime investigator who searches for behavioural patterns of criminal gangs. As a re-
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sult, this will allow us to develop SONCraft so that it will be able to help investigators
in detecting subtle patterns (modus operandi) embedded inside data automatically
retrieved by SONCraft. However, some problems are to be expected, and they are
discussed in the next section.
3.4 Loading data sets in SONCraft
Although SONCraft allows visualising data in an attractive way, it does so mainly
when cases are manually modelled. The main issue which users face while attempting
to load data automatically is overlapping and out-of-order placement. As shown in
Figure 3.1, we should expect both problems after inputting data sets into SONCraft.
Figure 3.1: Overlapping and out-of-order ONs.
Figure 3.2 shows a better way of presenting the same data which avoids over-
lapping, but still places ONs in an unstructured way. The latter problem will be
addressed by applying the idea of maximal concurrency to order the events, and so
also the ONs.
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Figure 3.2: Removing overlapping of ONs.
There are various reasons due to which overlapping occurs. The first one is due to
the fact that although data is loaded automatically when it is retrieved, it is loaded
randomly. The other reason is given by the fact that the current SONCraft platform
is not prepared to deal with data in an automatic way.
3.5 Proposed solution
Our approach to solving visualisation problems related to SONs consists in a careful
consideration of the positioning of the ONs within the workplace area. The method
involves the arrangement of ONs in a particular way so as to prevent and avoid over-
lapping and out-of-order placement by using maximal concurrency (a step execution
policy in the sense of [9]). The novel idea is to allow users to automatically control
and retrieve data from SONCraft leading to what one might call a policy-driven vi-
sualisation. This approach allows the visualisation of concurrency in display systems
which are capable of representing it, such as SONCraft.
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3.6 Policy-driven visualisation algorithm
We have taken advantage of the well-known algorithms such as topological sorting
and Tarjan algorithm. The idea behind the algorithm is explained and explanation
is supported by clarifying examples. Our consideration to solve the visualisation
challenge led us to use topological sorting which treats a directed graph as a basis of
a linear ordering for that graphs vertices [33]. In order to identify sets of maximally
concurrent events in SONs, we needed to find executable events and then co-locate
all transitions as maximally concurrent subsets in a particular set X.
For example, in Figure 3.3, there is a maximally concurrent set of events com-
prising event a in ON g0 and event f in ON g1, so these events are presented as
one cluster. After placing a and f in the same maximal ‘slice’, events b, c and g
represent a maximally concurrent execution and, similarly, after placing them in the
same maximal ‘slice’, events d and e form a maximally concurrent set.
Figure 3.3: Maximally concurrent representation of events.
The result of applying visualisation based on the maximal concurrency policy
discussed above is illustrated in Figure 3.3. As shown, all events have been manually
clustered into maximally concurrent steps. However, our aim is to allow data sets to
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be retrieved automatically rather than manually. As such, several algorithms have
been considered to assist us in doing so.
As Khan [33] emphasises, the main reasoning behind topological sort algorithm
is to find a list of start nodes which have no incoming edges [33] and then inserting
any such node into a particular set X. After that, the node is deleted from the graph
and further nodes with no incoming arcs are identified. The development of such
an algorithm will help us in finding sets of maximally concurrent events. Thus, our
approach consists in using the idea of a topological sort algorithm with the purpose
of finding maximal sets of events (steps) which are ready to be executed. In order to
identify the right events, we would need to find an event which has no previous events
connected to it. Although SONs are semantically acyclic graphs (in the sense of step
sequence semantics) and the topological algorithm was working properly, a challenge
arose during the process. It was due to a special kind of cycle (weak causality cycle)
within SONs, which occurs when two or more different ONs communicate with each
other through channel places. Figure 3.4 illustrates this situation.
As a result, initially, our algorithm could not handle such a situation, because
if it was to be applied, for instance, in Figure 3.4, then event a had another event
connected with it, i.e., event d. Our approach copes with these problems, should they
occur, by using Tarjan algorithm. This algorithm was adapted so as to allow one to
detect this special kind of cycle (i.e. weak causality cycle).
The adaptation implied the ability to push every event of a particular cycle in one
set as a maximal concurrency cluster, should this type of cycle occur. For instance,
after applying the algorithm to the graph in Figure 3.4, the first cycle between the
three existing ONs, namely (ON2, ON3 and ON4) was detected. This was made
via channel places (q0 and q1) and (q2 and q3). As such, the algorithm will push all
events in this cycle, namely events (a, d and f), to one set. After that, event b is
pushed into one set. Finally, the second cycle between ON1 and ON2 is detected via
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The output
Figure 3.4: Special kind of cycles in SONs.
channel places (q4 and q5) in one set, namely events g and c. Figure 3.4 illustrates the
result. The other interesting case that we have discovered during our investigation
of policy-driven visualisation in SONCraft is shown in the next example, depicted in
Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: The case of asynchronous communication.
In this case, if we apply algorithm based directly on topological sort, we would
group events e1 and e3 as a set, then take event e2 as a singleton set, and finally
event e4 as another singleton set. Figure 3.6 shows the result. Although events e2
and e4 can occur together after e1 and e3 due to asynchronous communication, this
could not be handled by the standard algorithm, because event e2 would be treated
before event e4. A possible solution is provided by an updated algorithm where, after
detecting asynchronous communication, one pushes all events within it into the same
set.
Figure 3.6: The standard Result.
Figure 3.7 shows the result obtained after applying this solution to our example.
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ALGORITHM 1: Visualize SONs’ events By Maximal Concurrency
Input: set_of_ons : Set of ONs ;
Output: set of maximal sorted ONs’ transitions
1 Start ;
2 array set_of_ons_to_check = set_of_ons ;
3 array set_of_maximal_concurrencies = array[array[Node]] ;
4 array temp_maximal_concurrencies = [] ;
5 boolean loop_again = true ;
6 while (loop again) do
7 loop_again = false ;
8 array temp_maximal_concurrencies = [] ;
9 for (ONs ons in set_of_ons_to_check) do
10 array ons_nodes = ons’s nodes;
11 array ons_set_of_cycle = [];
12 ons_set_of_cycle = Tarjan(ons);
13 for (Node node in ons_node) do
14 if (node is a transition) then
15 loop_again = true ;
16 if (node has no previous transition) then
17 boolean node_belongs_to_a_cycle;
18 for (Cycle cycle in ons_set_of_cycles) do
19 node_belongs_to_a_cycle = false;
20 if (node belongs to one of set_of_cycles’ cycles) then
21 push all cycle nodes to temp_maximal_concurrencies;
22 delete all cycle nodes from ons_nodes;
23 delete detect cycle from set_of_cycles;




28 if (node belongs to cycle = false) then
29 push node to temp_maximal_concurrencies;







37 push temp_maximal_concurrencies to set_of_maximal_concurrencies ;
38 end
39 return set_of_maximal_concurrencies ;
40 End ;
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Note that the algorithm always succeeds when applied to a well-formed SON thanks
to the general properties of SONs established in [42]
Figure 3.7: The result after detecting asynchronous communication.
3.7 Implementation and test results
We have implemented the policy-driven visualisation algorithm as a Java plug-in in
the SONCraft toolkit (based on the WorkCraft platform) [1]. WorkCraft is a platform
that provides a framework for the development and analysis of graph models [53].
We have created a menu (Retrieve Big Data) that has two features. As shown in
Figure 3.8, the first sub menu a is ‘Import SON data’, and the other is ‘Maximal ONs
events’.
Figure 3.8: Retrieve Big Data menu.
Here is a brief explanation of the functionality of our plug-in. Firstly, our al-
gorithm finds the starter conditions. These are conditions without pre-events. For
every starter condition, we initialise two arrays. This will track which conditions
will be added or removed for the next loop step. Next, we will find all cycles in the
graph via the Tarjan Algorithm and store them in a list. Afterwards, we need to
find starter events and store them in a list. Starter events are all events that do not
have previous events. Next, we will loop through all starter conditions. If we catch
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any starter events (for every event), we will add them to our temporary array if they
have no connections. We will also add them to our temporary array if they have two
connections, and the event does not follow an existing event in the temporary array.
Then we will set the next condition as a starter and mark it if it is not in a cycle.
However, if it is in a cycle, we will mark the starter condition and treat it separately.
Next, we will loop through all starter conditions again. For every starter condition,
we check to see if the condition is not being marked for removal (the condition has
been skipped because the event following the condition is a part of Trajan’s cycle).
If this is the case, we obtain its post-event and all cycle events. Just after the two
loops, we will decide if a set of maximal concurrency has completed or not. Finally,
after we are sure that there are no more starter conditions, we will display the max-
imal concurrency events [24]. We now discuss the results obtained after the plugin
Figure 3.9: First test result.
was developed and implemented. The first test was a scenario of different ONs with
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no communication between them. This shows that the plugin works correctly. For
instance, in Figure 3.9, the first set comprises events (a, c, d, e and f). Afterwards,
we obtain the next set consisting of two events (b and g). The last set has one event
(h).
Figure 3.10 provides another example of how our plugin treats complex scenario.
It involves a model with three synchronous communications. As Figure 3.10 shows,
the algorithm is working properly and the three maximal sets are (a, d and f), (b, e
and g) and (c).
Figure 3.10: Second test result.
Figure 3.11 shows the last test case. It involves asynchronous communications,
and the algorithm successfully pushes its events into one set, namely (e2 and e4).
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Figure 3.11: Third test result.
Finally, as displayed in the next figure 3.12, we provided a figure that shows a
larger example of our plug-in.
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Figure 3.12: Fourth test result.
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3.8 Limitations of the proposed Visualisation Ap-
proach
Although the proposed approach has contributed significantly to the visualisation
of the structure occurrence net (SON), the resulting visualisation approach has some
limitations. In the case of dealing with uploading of big data, the user may find issues
in the analysis of the data because the SONCraft is not able to deal with big data
yet. An interesting extension would be to apply the current visualisation algorithms
to other SON based models, such as behavioural abstractions. Finally, the SONCraft
needs to be improved in terms of dealing with uploading data automatically and in
real-time scenarios rather than just loading data from off-line files.
3.9 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, the problems of ONs overlapping and out-of-order placement have
been looked into, and a novel solution to address them has been proposed. The design
and development of the corresponding algorithm has been discussed. We provided
test examples showing that our algorithm works properly.
In future work we will address the visualisation of behavioural abstraction through
maximal concurrency policy. Another direction for future work is to implement vi-
sualisation based on local maximal concurrency [41]. It is a step execution policy
that introduces an extension of the basic model of Petri nets, by adding the notion of
located transitions and locally maximally concurrent executions of co-located transi-
tions in order to represent the compartmentalisation of membrane systems [41]. The
main idea depends on specifying the locality for transitions, each transition belonging
to a fixed unique locality. The precise mechanism to achieve this is to introduce a
partition of the set of all transitions using locality mapping [9].
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Chapter 4





At present time, serious warnings regarding the increasing number of DNS tunnelling
methods are on the rise. Attackers have used such techniques to steal data from
millions of accounts. The existing literature has convincingly demonstrated the extent
of the damage which DNS tunnelling can inflict on any given DNS server. Such
threats can be alleviated, through SON based approach described in this chapter.
The current chapter proposes the use of SON features with the purpose of detecting
DNS tunnelling, in the event of an actual attack.
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4.2 Introduction
In the past decades, internet usage and spread has grown dramatically, expanding
to include everything and anything, from small, online businesses, to large company
websites. As a consequence, what was initially ‘the Web’ became ‘Web 2.0’, consid-
ering the number of applications which has been developed, based on the internet.
It is the Domain Name System or DNS, which allows applications to use names in-
stead of numbers (IP addresses), which are considerably more difficult to deal with.
There are several works [49, 67, 18, 7] warning of the increasing number of DNS tun-
nelling methods, and attackers have used these techniques to compromise millions
of accounts [31]. The existing literature has demonstrated the damage which DNS
tunnelling can make on any deployed DNS server. DNS tunnelling allows hackers
to transfer data in a way which violates established system security policies [7]. The
danger which such an attack brings is that it can occur without triggering any alarms.
It is actually shown as a legitimate activity, because it uses a DNS protocol to trans-
mit information in the original way, instead of focusing on DNS vulnerabilities or
abusing or exploiting the system.
The reason behind using SONs to record DNS traffic are the different features that
SONs provide. For example, a SON combines multiple related ONS by using various
formal relationships, in particular, for communication. For instance, SON events can
be used to model various types of packets, such as sending a query, receiving a query,
sending a response and receiving a response, as well as asynchronous communication.
By means of these features, a SON is able to depict and analyse a DNS case. The
approach which we propose is to use SON features to detect DNS tunnelling in the
event of a real attack. This chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the
problem. Section 4.3 describes the background concerning DNS. Within Section 4.4
the DNS tunnelling tools discussed. Section 4.5 focuses on preprocessing datasets
stage. Section 4.6 describes a novel solution used to detect DNS tunnelling. In
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Section 4.7 discussed the results and evaluation of the proposed algorithm. Section 4.8
provides concluding remarks.
4.3 Authoritative name server
An authoritative name server only provides replies to DNS queries from data which
has been configured through an original source, for instance either by the domain
administrator or other dynamic DNS methods, as opposed to answers received via
queries made to other name servers which only maintain a small data cache. There
are two types of authoritative name servers: master or slave servers. A master server
stores all original records. By contrast, a slave server uses an automated updating
mechanism, as part of its DNS protocol, and communicates with the master server,
with the goal of maintaining identical copies of all records. A range of authoritative
name servers are assigned to each DNS zone. Such a range is stored within a parent
domain zone which is found within the name server (NS). In addition, an authoritative
server only provides ‘authoritative answers’, namely definitive answers, marked as
a protocol flag [51]. The protocol flag usually features in the the output of DNS
administration query tools, with the purpose of indicating that the responding name
server is indeed an authority for the respective domain [51].
We will use terminology presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Terminology used in the discussion of DNS tunelling.
No. Term Description
1 SONs Structured Occurrence Nets
2 ONs Occurrence Nets
3 DNS Domain Name System
4 HTTP HyperText Transfer Protocol
5 FTP File Transfer Protocol
6 SSH Secure Shell
7 IP Internet Protocol
8 iodine Software that lets you tunnel IPv4 data through a DNS server
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Figure 4.1: DNS tunnelling steps.
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4.4 DNS tunnelling tools
There are several tools that can be used by hackers to tunnelling the DNS protocol.
Most of these tools run under the Linux operation system, as describe below:
1. DeNise developed in Python is a proof of concept for tunnelling the TCP over
DNS.
2. dns2tcp is a network tool designed to rely on TCP connection via DNS traffic.
It contains two parts, first a server-side tool and second a client-side. In the
server, there is a list of resources; each resource is local or remote services that
listen to for TCP connections. However, the client listens to the TCP port and
relays each income connection via DNS [11].
3. DNScapy is a DNS tunnelling tool written in Python. It also has server-side
and client-side. However, server one can control multiple clients. It is created
an SSH tunnel via DNS packets [13].
4. DNScat is designed to create an encrypted command and control (C&C) chan-
nel over the DNS protocol. It is written in C [14].
5. Heyoka is an exfiltration tool that uses to proof of concept that spoofed DNS
requests to create a cover channel. Although this tool is fast, it is not under
development. It was tested on Windows [21].
6. Iodine is a DNS tunnelling tool. It is working under Linux. It allows users to
tunnel IPv4 data through a DNS server. This tool can be used to internet access
is fire-walled, but DNS queries allowed. It also provides high performance. As
well as portability which means it can be run on Win 32 side by side with Linux.
The iodine security is high by MD5 hash and can be filtered out any particular
packets that not come from the IP use when logging in. The other feature with
iodine is that there is less step to create successful tunnelling [16].
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We have focused on Iodine which is, as far as we know, a popular one among the
attackers.
4.5 Preprocessing datasets
Data collection constitutes the initial stage of our work. The first step consists of
discovering how DNS packets work, how they behave and what their structure is. This
step actually consists of two stages which have been conducted in parallel: first, the
extensive studying of literature pertaining to the subject and second, capturing real
data from a local DNS server. Initially, we captured normal DNS packets. Afterwards,
we modelled the normal packet in our model SON. Table 4.2 illustrates the DNS
packet and Figure 4.2 shows the result. This type of data can be modelled in SONs;
Figure 4.2: Normal DNS packet SON model
however, the ‘Info’ field has various information which must actually be split into
different fields. The reason behind this split is to distinguish whether the data packet
is either query or response. Additionally, this split serves to distinguish the domain
names, but also to determine the packets id (0x81fe), since it is this ID which is our
indicator, namely the one which links each packet (query) with its response. For
instance, in table 4.2 row 26 is the query and it is linked with row 29, which is the
response for the ID packet in question (0x81fe). We developed a python script [3] to
deal with this particular scenario. The main idea of this script is to split the ‘Info’
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Table 4.2: DNS Packets
No. Source Destination Info
26 172.20.10.2 172.20.10.1 query 0x81fe A google.com
29 172.20.10.1 172.20.10.2 response 0x81fe A google.com
Table 4.4: DNS Tunnelling Packet
No. Source Destination Operation PacketID Domain
1 172.20.10.2 146.185.138.197 query 0xc7cb paaac5ay.tunnel.carn.us.to
2 146.185.138.197 172.20.10.2 response 0xc7cb paaac5ay.tunnel.carn.us.to
field into 3 subfields, namely operation (which is either query or response), ‘PacketID’
and finally, ‘Domain’, as shown in the table 4.3. Afterwards, we modelled the last
result of a normal packet, to ensure how it will be represented within the SON, as
shown in Figure 4.2.
Table 4.3: Normal DNS Packet
No. Source Destination Operation PacketID Domain
1 172.20.10.2 172.20.10.1 query 0x81fe google.com
2 172.20.10.1 172.20.10.2 response 0x81fe google.com
Moreover, during the experiments, we collected attack packets, the result of DNS
tunnelling attempts. This was, in fact, the second challenge which we discovered and
treated. Table 4.4 represents one such attack packet. As noticeable, if we attempt to
model this packet, it will look the same as the normal packet, described above. Due
to this, the point of the research is to discover an idea or algorithm which allows the
clear distinguishing between normal packets and attack packets. The idea is one must
examine each particular domain and its sub-domains, with the purpose of discovering
whether or not a specific packet is an attack packet or not. As such, the python script
was updated to split the fields with which we are dealing with, in this case. The main
idea for the updated script version is that it loops on each domain field and links it
by a unique ID. It is called GroupID. As a result, afterwards, we can identify each
chunk of the domain and its sub-domains by that GroupID, as Table 4.5 illustrates.
Table 4.5 illustrates the link between the ‘Google’ domain and its subdomains. For
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Table 4.5: Mixed Packets (normal and abnormal packets)
No. Source Destination Operation GroupID Domain
1 172.20.10.2 172.20.10.1 query 001 google.com
2 172.20.10.1 172.20.10.2 response 001 google.com
216.58.206.206
3 172.20.10.2 172.20.10.1 query 001 maps.google.com
4 172.20.10.1 172.20.10.2 response 001 maps.google.com
5 172.20.10.2 146.185.138.197 query 002 paaac5ay.tunnel.carn.us.to
6 146.185.138.197 172.20.10.2 response 002 paaac5ay.tunnel.carn.us.to
7 172.20.10.2 146.185.138.197 query 002 paaydani.tunnel.carn.us.to
8 146.185.138.197 172.20.10.2 response 002 paaydani.tunnel.carn.us.to
instance, we assume ‘google.com’ and ‘maps.google.com’ have the same group id,
namely ‘001’. However, subdomains (paaac5ay) and (paaydani) have been grouped
to ’.us.to’ via group id, which is actually ‘002’. So, the idea is to initially identify the
domain, i.e. ‘google’ and loop to find any particular sub-domain of ‘google’ and link
it with a unique group id.
4.5.1 Mixing data
In order to simulate a real scenario of DNS server behaviour, the collected data con-
sisted of two main parts. The first part included the data collected during the attack
experiment. The second part includes normal data, collected from the university. For
this data to make sense, and in order to simulate a real scenario example, we created
python script [2] mixing these two kinds of data. This data mix will be evaluated in
different stages in the evaluation section (4.7).
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4.6 Proposed solution
4.6.1 Detecting DNS tunnelling using SONs
The main idea of our algorithm [4] to detect DNS tunnelling is to model DNS data
i.e., each particular transaction and the way it will communicate with the local DNS
server. We assume that each packet is a unique ON. And the local DNS server is one
ON. Each packet (ON) communicates with the local DNS server by channel place
(thick circle) via events (Send− query and receive− query), as shown in figure 4.2.
The client (ONc) sends a query to local DNS server (ONserver), and then DNS server
responds to the client as shown in Figure 4.2. This is the normal packet. When
we were to model the attack packet, we found it is the same as the normal one in
terms of communication and behaviour. The reason is that we examined each packet
as a separate one. However, to detect an attack we need to examine each domain
and its sub-domains in order to examine either we see normal or abnormal packets.
For instance, if google.com, map.google.com and developers.google.com are involved,
then we need to deal with all google domains and its sub-domains, and model them
as one of chunk of domain packets. So, we group each domain and its sub-domains
with unique ID as in prepossessing section above. The result is seen in Figure 4.3,
where we can distinguish between normal and abnormal packets (we displayed the
attack ON very small to fit the width of the text; however, the ON transaction is
actually bigger).
Figure 4.3: Normal and Abnormal ONs
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4.6.2 Detection DNS tunnelling algorithm
The main idea behind the algorithm is first to detect any ON input, whether it is
a normal input or an ON representing a DNS attack. Before going more in depth,
it should be mentioned that ONs refer to DNS packets. Furthermore, we assume
the local DNS local server to be another ON. It does not matter whether inputs are
normal or representing a DNS attack. We examine each ON input and count its events
which communicate with the DNS Server ON. If the number of those ON events is
less than threshold value, we flag it as a normal ON. Otherwise, we flag it as an
abnormal ON. Then, we check whether or not we had abnormal ONs; if so, then we
know a DNS attack has occurred. Finally, we should mention that the aforementioned
threshold was identified via logistic regression, a widely used statistics model. The
idea behind this binomial model resides in properly estimating the parameters of the
logistics model. From a mathematical standpoint, the model relies on variables with
two possible values, for instance ‘win’ or ‘lose’ or ‘pass’ or ‘fail’. As such, we applied
logistic recognition to available data in order to estimate the threshold, and estimate
how many events within a particular GroupID could be suspicious.
4.6.2.1 The calculated threshold
It is at the core of the logistic regression model. From a mathematical standpoint,
logistic regression performs multiple linear regression functions of the required fea-
ture, such as the number of events. These functions are based on the dependent,
dichotomous variable, i.e. ‘attack’ or ‘no attack’. The aforementioned functions pro-
duce a threshold by using the logit equation. Finally, this threshold can be used
in our algorithm. The mathematical aim of linear regression functions is to build an
equation with the following coefficients: (a) and (c), as follows: y = ax + c, where (y)
represents the probability of an attack and (x) is the number of events. Afterwards,
the values for both the number of events and the dependent variable, namely ‘attack’
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or ‘not attack’, will be inserted; this will allow us to perform regression analysis,
meaning we will be able to calculate the values of (a) and (c), which in turn will
increase the likelihood of (y) conforming to ground truth values. Once these values
are known, they can be used to calculate the threshold.
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ALGORITHM 2: Detection DNS Tunnelling algorithm using SON
Input: set_of_ons : Set of All Ons
dns_server_on : DNS Server ON
attack_max_events : DNS Server threshold to interpret an
attack
Output: set_of_normal_ons = Set of normal ONs, not presenting a
potential attack.
set_of_abnormal_ons = Set of abnormal ONs, presenting a
potential attack.
1 Interpretation:
if size of (set_of_abnormal_ons) > 0 then
2 DNS Attack;
3 else
4 No DNS Attack;
5 end
6 Start ;
7 array set_of_normal_ons = [] ;
8 array set_of_abnormal_ons = [] ;
9 integer set_of_normal_ons_index = 0 ;
10 integer set_of_abnormal_ons_index = 0 ;
11 integer connected_events = 0 ;
12 for (count_event(current_on)) < attack_max_events)) do
13 connected_events_count = 0;
14 if (count_event(current_on)) < attack_max_events)) then
15 set_of_normal_ons[set_of_normal_ons_index] = current_on;
16 set_of_normal_ons_index = set_of_normal_ons_index + 1;
17 continue;
18 else
19 for (Event current_event in current_on’s events) do
20 if (current_event is connected to dns_server_on) then
21 connected_events_count = connected_events_count +1;
22 end
23 end












1 return structure : {set_of_normal_ons , set_of_abnormal_ons} ;
2 count_event(ON on) function :;
Input: on : ON
Output: events_count : number of events of ON.;
3 Start ;
4 integer vents_count = 0 ;
5 for (Event current_event in current_on’s events) do
6 events_count = events_count + 1; ;
7 end
8 return events_count ;
9 End ;
4.7 Result testing and evaluation
We considered the following proportions of attacking packets (as percentage of the
total packets):
0%, 1%, 5%, 10%, 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, 90%, 95%, 99% and 100%.
In addition, we used the sensitivity and specificity methods [35], developed to evaluate
a system of computer-assisted diagnosis. Hence we used a tried and tested method,
with the only change being made to the terminology, as follows:
First, True positive (TP) result: attack transactions were correctly identified as
attacks.Then, False positive (FP) result: normal transactions were incorrectly iden-
tified attacks.And, True negative result (TN) : normal transactions were identified
as normal transactions.Finally, False negative (FN) result: attack transactions were
incorrectly identified as normal transactions. In terms of the data mix (of normal
and attack packets), we created a Python script [2]. The idea behind the script was
to mix the two data sets, namely: the normal and attack packets. Each time we
ran the script, we asked the script to mix the data, relying on the percentage from
each file, such as 10% normal and 90% attack; as a result, we obtained one file with
mixed data. The main data sets for each packet type, i.e., normal or attack packets,
were collected during a five-minute time span. The data for both sets consisted of
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roughly 700 DNS packets. After running the algorithm, we checked the sensitivity
and specificity through an evaluation method, obtaining the following results. As
evident in (1) in Table 4.6, in True Positives and False Negatives, we assumed that
there was no result because this data set had no attack packets. However, in (2)
in Table 4.6, when the data set had 1% attack and 99% normal packets, we got a
0% True Positive, which means there were no attacked packets detected as attack
packets, although we had 1% attack data. This is because the number of packets in
this data set was less than the threshold. Regarding False Negatives, we also got 0%
because there were no attack packets detected as normal packets. Likewise, in (3) in
Table 4.6, the same situation applied. However, in (4) in Table 4.6, the algorithm
detected 7.1% from a total of 10% of the attack data; however, it failed to detect
2.9% of the attack packets. After we checked the data sets manually, we found that
most of these packets were only request queries to the DNS server, to which the DNS
server did not respond, so our algorithm skipped them. However, from this 2.9%, the
algorithm did not attacked them, although they have query and response packets.
In future research, we will further investigate this issue in order to discover why this
happened. Another interesting point is that, in (4) in Table 4.6, there is a False
Positive, which means the algorithm detected 9.4% of the normal packets as attack
packets; after investigating this, we found that Google had sent many requests to the
DNS server as unusual requests, and these request events were above our threshold.
When we rerun the experiment, we did not face this issue. Moreover, as evident in
(7) in Table 4.6, no normal packets were detected as attack packets (False Positives).
Finally, in (15) in Table 4.6, the False Positives and True Negatives were ‘N/A’; this
was because, in these data sets, there were no normal packets at all.
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Table 4.6: Table of results
No. % normal and abnormal packets TP FP TN FN
1 0% attack, 100 normal N/A 9.7% 90.92% N/A
2 1% attack, 99 normal 0% 9.77% 90.92% 0%
3 5% attack, 95 normal 0% 8.9% 91.1% 0%
4 10% attack, 90 normal 7.1% 9.4% 90.6% 2.9%
5 20% attack, 80 normal 82.9% 5.3% 94.7% 17.1%
6 30% attack, 70 normal 86.7% 5.3% 94.7% 13.3%
7 40% attack, 60 normal 88.5% 0% 100% 11.5%
8 50% attack, 50 normal 90.9% 0% 100% 9.1%
9 60% attack, 40 normal 91.5% 0% 100% 8.5%
10 70% attack, 30 normal 91.1% 0% 100% 8.9%
11 80% attack, 20 normal 91.5% 0% 100% 8.5%
12 90% attack, 10 normal 91.8% 0% 100% 8.2%
13 95% attack, 5 normal 92% 0% 100% 8%
14 99% attack, 1 normal 92.3% 0% 100% 7.7%
15 100% attack, 0 normal 92.5% N/A N/A 7.5%
4.8 Concluding remarks
This chapter described a novel solution to DNS tunnelling detection based on SONs.
An detection algorithm has been designed and implemented. Also, data preprocessing
and a set of experiments have been discussed. Further work will focus on improving
the current algorithm, aiming at allowing it to work automatically in terms of reading
packets in real-time scenarios. In addition, we will model and develop algorithms
dealing with more than one DNS server at a time, including all user packets. In
addition, we will use other DNS tunnelling tools, instead of ‘iodine’, in order to







In this chapter, we present a new class of SONs based on multi (coloured) tokens.
This extension was motivated by the result we obtained in Chapter 4. Although
the results were exemplary, the limited screen size and large number of transactions
(DNS packets) meant that we were able to visualise only a small part of data. Hence
limitations existed in terms of visualisation. To address this challenge, we will pro-
vide a new condensed/abstract representation of a large number of similar concurrent
processes so that the same underlying net structure can be used to model their be-
haviour. This arrangement makes the analysis of the overall behaviour more efficient
and its visualisation more effective (and, in many cases, simply feasible).
5.2 Introduction
After describing the methods, techniques and algorithms used in this thesis, we will
now introduce a new class of Structured Occurrence Nets (SONs). We see this exten-
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sion as the beginning of new techniques and implementations that will be using big
data and integrate with SONCraft in future.
Today’s world deals with vast amounts of data that we store in offline storage, such
as hard drives, local servers or the web. All technology today must handle that data,
whether it relates to e-commerce, health or even crime. Managing data on such a large
scale is a challenge, both academically and industrially. As mentioned in the previous
chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) the SON framework provides new and interesting results
related to the analysis of cybercrime investigations. However, because of the inherent
features of SONs (only one token can be present in a condition at any time), it lacks
in ability to present large amounts of data. The idea behind discussed extensions is to
enhance SONs to be able to visualise the large data concisely. Our aim in extending
conditions to accept more than one token is that, while working on Chapter 4, we
successfully obtained an interesting result in the detection of DNS tunnelling. In order
to visualise groups of DNS packets — because these packets are identical within the
model — we have to repeat each one as a unique model, as shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Normal and Abnormal ONs.
As shown, there are four normal packets that behave in the same way. Our idea is
that, if all the above packets behave in the same way, then it is suitable to make them
a single mode in one model and to refer to each behaviour by a token rather than by
a model (net structure). The multiple tokens will enable us to use multiple model
behaviours within a single model when all the models are identical. The extension
will focus not only on providing new standard tokens but will provide a way to use
the well-known Coloured Petri Net (CPN) technique. CPN is a graphics-oriented
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language used to design and specify simulation and verification of systems. It is a
extension of the concept of the mathematical model of Petri Nets (PNs). CPNs allow
distinctions between tokens. In other words, CPNs allow tokens to have attached
data values. These attached values are known as token colour which can come from
an arbitrarily complex data type.
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.3 provides an overview of the big
data. Section 5.4 provides an overview of general Petri Nets (PNs). After that,
Section 5.5 provides an overview of Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs). An extension of the
notion of CSON is given in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 will discuss and provide different
examples of coloured tokens in SONs. Finally, the conclusion and future work is
presented in Section 5.8.
5.3 Big Data
Massive data is used on the internet in today’s world. The amount of data will
increase by 2025 [17] so that it will cross the total brain size of people. This growth
will come from advances in digital sensors, communications and storage, which will
create a massive amount of data [10]. As a result of this growth, we will focus on big
data in this section, including the definition of big data and big data management.
Then we will focus on how big data can be handled within SONs.
Big data [48] is any particular data set the size of which outweighs the normal
ability of data set tools. Additionally, in [10], big data is defined as too big to be
controlled, operated or analysed by normal database concepts such as Structured
Query Language (SQL). To be considered big data, any particular data set must
have the three Vs: volume, variety and velocity [17]. The main benefit of supporting
big data is to allow us to analyse big data sets, such as those on health, biochemistry,
genetics and criminal activity, in order to carry out effective analysis and arrive at
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new knowledge. The other benefit is variety; this kind of data does not have a fixed
structure, which gives us a chance to present it in our approach in most helpful way
for our analysis. Big data can be organised, for instance, in relational databases,
or in semi-structured ways such as web logs, social media feeds, emails or sensors.
Big data architecture needs high-speed data from different sources including web,
NoSQL and DMBS, and it must be dealt with using diverse access protocols. In some
applications, the generation of data is required to generate important data, and then
it may be interesting to obtain further analysis and capture these metadata to store
with similar data.
An appropriate visualisation of big data sets will lead to clearer images for crim-
inal investigators and potentially allow them to link crime events and places in a
representation of data that helps detect crimes. The results of such research could
also be an essential step toward crime prevention. Another benefit of using big data
is the extraction of valuable knowledge from big and complex data sets, and the iden-
tification of useful information retrieved from various data sources. In addition, data
can be explained as an automated extraction of predictive information from large sets
of data.
5.4 Petri Nets (PNs)
(General) Petri Nets (PNs) were introduced by Carl Adam Petri in 1962 in order to
model concurrent behaviour within a system. A PN is triple PN = (P, T, ϕ) where
P is a finite set of places, and T is a finite set of transitions. These two sets are
disjoint. The ϕ is a flow function from (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) to N. A marking is
mapping M : P → N. M(p) gives the number of tokens in each place p of PN . PNs
are directed graphs that have two types of nodes: places are represented by circles,
transitions are represented by bars or boxes, and tokens are represented by small
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black circles. Each arc refers to ϕ(p, t) or ϕ(t, p), where p and t are the endpoints of
the arc. Figure 5.2 show a PN example.
Figure 5.2: Petri Net example.
A transition t ∈ T is enabled at marking M if for every p ∈ P , ϕ(p, t) ≤ M(p)
[70]. Moreover, if the transition t is enabled, then it may be fired by removing ϕ(p, t)
tokens from each place p and placing ϕ(t, p′) tokens in every place p′. For example,
the transition t2 in Figure 5.2 is enabled at marking M = (1, 0, 0, 1, 0), as the only
input place of t2 satisfies ϕ(p1, t2) ≤ M(p1). After firing the transition t2, the PN
will reach a new marking M ′ = (0, 1, 0, 1, 0).
5.5 Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs)
Coloured Petri Nets (CPNs) [28] is a graphics-oriented language for the design, sim-
ulation and verification of concurrent systems. It is an extension of PNs, which is
well suited to systems that support communication and synchronisation between the
components of systems. CPNs can be used for communication protocols, embedded
systems, workflow analysis, and distributed systems.
In our particular case, CPNs have four main components. Places (represented
by circles), transitions (represented by rectangles or boxes), and arcs (represented
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by arrows), describe the operation of changes to the state of CPN when transitions
happen. The fourth component of CPNs are tokens, which are a set of markers to be
placed inside the places. A main difference with PNs is that each of these tokens has
a data value that comes from a given data type.
5.6 Extensions
What we would like to do is extend the notion of CSON to cover the situation when
more than one concurrent process is executed using the same static net structure of
a CSON. This will be done in two different ways. However, before doing so we need
to clarify what could be behavioral properties which any such extension is required
to satisfy.
Basically, what we want to achieve is a condensed/abstract representation of per-
haps a large number of similar concurrent processes (so that the same underlying net
structure can be used to model their behaviour), making the analysis of the overall
behaviour more efficient and its visualisation more effective (and in many cases simply
feasible).
We first introduce an extension of CSONs based on ‘coloured tokens’ and ‘coloured
events’ which is an instance of a well-established Petri net technique of coloured (or
high-level) nets [43].
Definition 5.6.1 (CCSON) A coloured communication structured occurrence net
(ccson) is a tuple
ccson = (ON1, . . . , ONk, Q,W, col)
such that
cson = (ON1, . . . , ONk, Q,W )
is a CSON as in Definition 2.3.3 and col 6= ∅ is a finite set of colours.
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• The coloured tokens and coloured events of ccson are respectively:
Ccol = (C ∪Q) × col
Ecol = E × col
• A marking of ccson is a set of coloured tokens, and the initial marking of
ccson is Mccson0 = M
cson
0 × col.
• For each (e, c) ∈ E× col,
•(e, c) = •e × {c}
(e, c)• = e• × {c}.









• For each colour c ∈ col , the set {e | (e, c) ∈ U} is a step of cson (see, for
example an enabled step U = {(e0, B), (e1, B)} in Figure 5.14
• A step U is ccson-enabled at a marking M if (•U \ U•) ⊆M .
• If U is ccson-enabled at a marking M , then U can be fired and produce a new
marking M ′ given by
M ′ = (M ∪ U•) \ •U.
This is denoted by M [U〉ccsonM ′.
• A step sequence execution of ccson is a sequence
γ = M0U1 . . .Mn−1UnMn
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such that M0 = M
ccson
0 and Mi−1[Ui〉ccsonMi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Intuitively, every colour µ ∈ col corresponds to a separate process running on the
net structure of ccson.
To show that the behaviours of ccson are strongly related to the behaviours of
cson, we introduce a projection operation from colored tokens and events to the
original conditions and events. For every set X of coloured tokens and/or events, and
for every colour µ ∈ col, we denote:
X↓µ = {x | (x, µ) ∈ X}.
Theorem 5.6.1 Assume the notation as in Definition 5.6.1.
1. Let γ = M0U1 . . .Mn−1UnMn be a step sequence execution of ccson. Then, for
every µ ∈ col,
γµ = (M0↓µ) (U1↓µ) . . . (Mn−1↓µ) (Un↓µ Mn↓µ)
is a step sequence execution of cson. Moreover, for i = 0, 1, . . . , n and j =

























M i0 × {µi})(
l⋃
i=1
U i1 × {µi}) . . . (
l⋃
i=1
U in × {µi})(
l⋃
i=1
M in × {µi})
is a step execution of ccson.
Proof: The result follows directly from definitions. 
Part (1) of the above theorem means that every step sequence execution of ccson
can be seen as a combination of a number of step sequence executions of the underlying
cson. Part (2) states the opposite, namely that for a set of step executions of the
underlying cson, for each available colour, one can combine them into a step sequence
execution of ccson.
Using colours to distinguish similar processes running over the same net structure
is an abstraction technique which improves the visualisation of the overall system
behaviour. In particular, coloured tokens can be placed in the circles.
The next definition abstracts sets of coloured tokens to multisets of ordinary tokens
(conditions), and sets of coloured events to multisets of events. In this way, one
‘forgets’ about the colours and only counts the number of processes which have their
local states in a given condition at any time. This is highly advantageous both for
visualisation and verification.
A multiset over a set X is a function τ : X → N. If τ and τ ′ are multisets over X,
then we define τ + τ ′, τ − τ ′ and k · τ as multisets over X such that, for every x ∈ X:
(τ + τ ′)(x) = τ(x) + τ ′(x)
(τ − τ ′)(x) = max{τ(x)− τ ′(x), 0}
(k · τ)(x) = k · τ(x).
1We can assume that the step sequence executions γi have the same length. This can always be
ensured by padding the shorter executions with empty steps.
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Definition 5.6.2 (MCSON) A multiset communication structured occurrence net
(mcson) is a tuple
mcson = (ON1, . . . , ONk, Q,W,m)
such that m ≥ 1 and
cson = (ON1, . . . , ONk, Q,W )
is a CSON as in Definition 2.3.3.
• A marking of mcson is a multiset over C∪Q, and the initial marking of mcson
is Mmcson0 = k ·Mcson0 .
• A step of mcson is a multiset over E.








• If U is mcson-enabled at a marking M , then U can be fired and produce a new
marking M ′ given, for every c ∈ C, by:







This is denoted by M [U〉mcsonM ′.
• A step sequence execution of mcson is a sequence
γ = M0U1 . . .Mn−1UnMn
such that M0 = M
mcson
0 and Mi−1[Ui〉mcsonMi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
We will now show that the behaviours of multiset based CSONs and the behaviours
of coloured CSONs are closely related.
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Theorem 5.6.2 Assume the notations as in Definitions 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 and assume
that m = |col|.
1. Let γ = M0U1 . . .Mn−1UnMn be a step sequence execution of ccson. Then:
γ′ = M ′0U
′







is a step sequence execution of mcson, where, for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n, j =
1, . . . , n, p ∈ C ∪Q, and e ∈ E:
M ′i(p) = | {µ | (p, µ) ∈ Mi} |
U ′j(e) = | {µ | (e, µ) ∈ Uj} |.
(5.1)
2. Let γ′ = M ′0U
′






n be a step sequence execution of mcson. Then
there are step sequence executions
γ̂j = M̂ j0 Û
j






n (1 ≤ j ≤ m)










3. Let γ′ = M ′0U
′






n be a step sequence of mcson. Then there is a
step sequence execution of ccson
γ = M0U1 . . .Mn−1UnMn
such that the formula (5.1) is satisfied.
2In the formula below, we treat sets as special kind of multisets.
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Proof: Part (1) follows from a straightforward induction on the length of the se-
quence. Part (2) can be shown using Theorem 18 in [66] which essentially proves
the required property (called there serialisability) for acyclic marked graphs, where
each place has at most one input transition and at most one output transition. Both
these properties hold for mcson, and it is possible to convert (for the purpose of
establishing the result) mcson into an equivalent acyclic marked graph (by gluing
together clusters of synchronised transitions). Part (3) follows from Part (2). 
Parts (2,3) of the above result mean that the behaviours of mcson can be fac-
torised onto behaviours of cson.
5.7 Examples of coloured tokens in SONs
This section provides some examples of the proposed extension to include coloured
tokens. First, consider an occurrence net ON1 shown in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Coloured tokens in simple example (Step 1).
In this example, event e0 is ready to fire as it is activated both by A and B tokens
present inside condition c0. As a result of executing coloured event (e0, A), token A
moves to condition c1. After that, coloured event (e0, B) is still enabled and can fire
using token B, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: Coloured tokens in simple example (Step 2).
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Then, coloured event (e0, B) can occur causing token B to move to condition c1,
as illustrated in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5: Coloured tokens in simple example (Step 3).
Another example is shown in Figure 5.6, where condition c0 has two coloured
tokens (A and B), both enabling event e0.
Figure 5.6: Coloured token in ON (Step 1).
As a result of coloured event (e0, A) and (e0, B) occurs, tokens A and B are
removed from condition c0, and tokens A and B are placed in conditions c1 and c2.
Subsequently, coloured events (e1, A), (e1, B), (e2, A) and (e2, B) are enabled, as
shown in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: Coloured token in one ON (Step2).
As a result of event (e1, A) occurs, token A first moves to condition c3, as shown
in Figure 5.8.
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Figure 5.8: Coloured token in one ON (Step 3).
Then, event (e2, A) occurs, and as a result, token A moves to condition c4, as
shown in Figure 5.9. Now, event (e3, A) is ready to be fired. Once this event occurs,
token A moves to condition c5, as shown in Figure 5.10.
Figure 5.9: Coloured token in one ON (Step 4).
Figure 5.10: Coloured token in one ON (Step 5).
After that, event (e1, B) occurs, as a result token B moves to condition c3, as
shown in next figure 5.11.
Figure 5.11: Coloured token in one ON (Step 6).
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Then, event (e2, B) occurs, and as a result token B moves to condition c4, as
shown in figure 5.12.
Figure 5.12: Coloured token in one ON (Step 7).
Now event (e3, B) is ready to be fired. Once this event e3 occurs, then token B
moves to condition c5, as shown in figure 5.13.
Figure 5.13: Coloured token in one ON (Step 8).
The next example illustrates how two ONs communicate with each other. Initally,
events e0 in occurrence net ON1 and event e1 in occurrence net ON2 are ready to
be fired as coloured events (e0, A) and (e0, B), as shown in Figure 5.14.
Figure 5.14: Coloured tokens in CCSON (Step 1).
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First, coloured events (e0, B) and (e1, B) occur simultaneously. As a result, tokens
B in both conditions c0 and c2 move to conditions c1 and c3, as shown in Figure 5.15.
Figure 5.15: Coloured tokens in CCSON (Step 2).
Then, coloured event (e0, A is ready to be fired. After its execution, token A in
condition c0 moves to condition c1, and token A placed in q0 as shown in Figure 5.16.
Figure 5.16: Coloured tokens in CCSON (Step 3).
Finally, only event (e1, A) is enabled. After its firing, we obtain marking, as shown
in Figure 5.17.
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Figure 5.17: Coloured tokens in CCSON (Step 4).
The final example in this chapter demonstrates how the coloured tokens can be
used for abstracting large models. As shown in Figure 5.18, four ONs –— ON1, ON2,
ON3, ON4 –—represent normal DNS packets.
Figure 5.18: Four ONs represent normal packets of DNS and one ON represents Local
server.
In ON1, which represents one normal packet in DNS, event e0 sends a query to
event e0a, and then the local server ON5 responds via event e1a. This example
assumes there are only four normal packets of DNS, and even then presenting them
in one screen is not easy. However, after the coloured extension is applied, the model
of Figure 5.18 can be abstracted as one ON (ON1) for the four packets of DNS and
one ON (ON2) for the local DNS server, shown in Figure 5.19.
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Figure 5.19: Abstracting large model to small one.
Because all four DNS packets are identical and behave in the same way, the ONs
are replaced by tokens, and only one ON is obtained for the four ONs, with four tokens
for conditions c0 and c1. Once a new normal packet that behaves in the same way as
previous packets is obtained, then the number of tokens in c0 and c3 is increased by
adding more tokens.
The abstraction presented in Figure 5.19 may not be fully satisfactory in all cases
as it overapproximates the behaviours of the original CSON. The reason is that in the
considered scenario there are four instances of packet behaviour and only one instance
of server behaviour. To cope with this situation, we now outline a generalisation of
the abstraction described earlier.
We assume that cson = (ON1, . . . , ONk, ON,Q,W ) is such that the following
hold (below m ≥ 1):
• For each ONi there are distinct buffer places qi1, . . . , qim for communicating with
ON . Moreover, pi1, . . . , p
i
m are distinct events in ONi, and r
i
1, . . . , r
i
m are distinct
events in ON connected to these buffer places in such a way that for l =













l) ∈ W (for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k).
• The ONi’s are isomorphic and not communicating with each other. Moreover,
p1l , . . . , p
k
l are ‘isomorphic’ events (for every 1 ≤ l ≤ m).
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• For i = 1, . . . , k, the events pi1, . . . , pim are causally ordered (in this way) in ONi.
• The events r11, . . . , r1m, . . . , rk1 , . . . , rkm are causally ordered (in this way) in ON .
Then we can model cson by deleting ON2, . . . , ONk together with q
i
1, . . . , q
i
m (for
2 ≤ i ≤ k) and attached arcs. Following this we then add (q1l , ril) for each deleted
(qil , r
i
l) ∈ W , and (ril , q1l ) for each deleted (ril , qil) ∈ W . Finally, the initial marking
of ON1 is set to have k tokens in each initial condition. Figure 5.20 illustrates the
construction for the example in Figure 5.18.
Figure 5.20: Abstracting large model to small one.
5.8 Concluding remarks
This chapter proposed an extension of the notion of CSON to cover situations when
more than one concurrent process is executed using the static net structure of CSON.
We have proposed this in two different ways, and have emphasised the motivation
for this extension. The concept of big data has been presented and discussed. PNs
and CPNs and their features also have been covered in this chapter. Examples of
the proposed extension have also been provided. Future work will focus on the use
of the extension in abstracted versions of SONs, as well as on the application of this
extension to real scenarios of crime or cybercrime cases.
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Chapter 6
SONCraft: A Plug-in for Loading
Large Amount of Data
6.1 Summary
In this chapter, we present the open-source SONCraft plug-in, which is used help
users in automatically load large amounts of data. Both the concept and tools are
explained Finally, we evaluate the SONCraft plug-in using the standard principles of
user interface interactions.
6.2 Introduction
SONCraft provides several features allowing the construction of SON-based mod-
els and the validation of such models. Several implemented algorithms allow for a
friendly user interface, that support effective usage. Also, using such tools help users
construct SON models for different scenarios. SON formalism can be used to make
it easy to portray and analyse complicated behaviours, such as failure behaviours of
complex evolving systems. Such systems are usually large with their subsystems con-
currently communicating with each other. As such, their behaviours can be modified
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by other systems. For example, distributed systems, such as software, are regularly
updated; such updates can add new features or solve existing issues. Although there
is a massive volume of data available on the internet, related to different domains
and there are several tools and analysis techniques that deal with such data auto-
matically, SONCraft lacks features that deal with this type of data. To examine how
SONCraft can deal with large data sets, we have built an automatic SON model
for this particular task. We designed and implemented a plugin that can help users
in automatically load large amounts of data. This chapter is organised as follows:
Section 7.2 presents SONCraft; Section 7.3 introduces the Loader algorithm; Section
7.4 describes the plugin’s implementation and design; Section 7.5 focuses on how the
plug-in works; finally, Section 7.6 provides several concluding remarks.
6.3 Loader algorithm
The first step of discovering SONCraft’s ability in terms of automatically loading/re-
trieving data from a particular source such as CSV files was to test how SONCraft
deals with this type of data. This plug-in was developed to retrieve data from CSV
files and convert all data in that file into usable data for SON models. We created
a CSV file with random data. We assumed that each row in the CSV file represents
one ON. For instance, as shown in the next diagram, we assumed that ON1 = (c0,
e0, c1) was one ON. Moreover, (c0) was the first initial place, (e0) was the first event,
and (c1) was another place. We did the same for the following ONs, namely ON2,
ON3, and ON4. The labels in the document help illustrate each particular ON, in
other words, they are not shown in the CSV file.
So, the loader must consider each row as an ON and model it in SONCraft.






Table 6.1: CSV file data
Figure 6.1: Conversion of CSV file data into ONs.
6.3.1 The algorithm
The main idea of the loader algorithm is that the input consists of a CSV file’s full
path. The algorithm’s first step is to generate the initial array which will store sets
of ONs. Then, to perform the first iteration over the rows of the Excel sheet. We
assume each cell that loaded from the CSV file to be a particular node. Each time,
meaning with each iteration, we check whether or not the node has previous nodes,
or, if this is not the case, it is identified as the end of the row. Every time, we identify
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ALGORITHM 3: Loader Algorithm
Input: file_path : Full path to CSV file
Output: SON = Set Ons, generated from the CSV file.
1 Start ;
2 array set_of_ons = [] ;
3 SON final_SON ;
4 for String current_line in file_lines do
5 String [] = current_line_tokenized;
6 Integer index = 0;
7 boolean add_to_existing_on = false;
8 ONElement en_element ;
9 ON current_ON;
10 for (String string_element in current_line_tokenized) do
11 if (index mod 2 == 0) then
12 en_element = Condition;
13 else
14 en_element = Event;
15 end
16 if (en_element == Condition && on_element not in
set_of_ons) then
17 current_ON;
18 new_ON ← attach(condition, en_element);
19 else
20 current_ON ← find(on_element, set_of_ons);
21 current_ON ← attach(condition, en_element );
22 add_to_existing_on ← =true;
23 end
24 end
25 if (add_to_existing_on = true) then




30 final_SON ← build_from_ONS(set_of_ons);
31 end
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the node we check if it is a place (odd) or an event (even). Finally, once the entire
row is verified, it is built as an ON. To achieve this, we must use an import method
that SONs accept, like InputStream. The return is a SON model whos main utility
is to transform an InputStream from a chosen file to a SON model that can be later
drawn in the SON Workcraft plugin.
6.4 Plugin design and implementation Design
6.4.1 Graphical User Interface design
This section discusses the plugin design and implementation. First, the GUI (Graph-
ical User Interface): the SONCraft data tool GUI menu classes have two custom
classes. The first class is “SONDataTool”, and it’s used for the importing of SON
data (“Import SON Data”), as illustrated in Figure 6.3 below.
Figure 6.2: Graphical user interface classes.
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Figure 6.3: Import SON Data tool.
The second class is “MaxOccurenciesTool”, it is used for “Maximal ONs events”,
as illustrated in Figure 6.4
Figure 6.4: Maximal ONs events tool.
Both of these classes extend WorkCraft’s “DataRetrievalTool” class, which is re-
sponsible for retrieving data from files. The “DataRetrievalTool” class extends the
abstract, “PromotedTool” class, which in turn implements the Interface tool; all
these tools are present in the “org.workcraft” package, as part of the “Workcraft-
Core” project. The “DataRetrievalTool” and “SonDataTool” classes are part of the
“org.workcraft.plugins.transform” package.
6.4.2 Data retrieval Back-end design
The “MaxOccurenciesTransformer” class is present in the “org.workcraft.plugins.son.interop”
package and implements the “Transformer” interface which is found in the “org.workcraft.interop”
package that also contains the algorithm described in the previous section. This al-
gorithm is also responsible for transforming data into a SON graph. The “Model
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transform(Model model)” method is the main method of the “MaxOccurencies” al-
gorithm. It is called from the “org.workcraft.plugins.transform.MaxOccurenciesTool”
class, by using the “void run(WorkspaceEntry we)” method. It accepts a SON Model
and calculates the “Max Occurencies” output. The “SON importSON(InputStream
inputStream)” method is responsible for transforming data into a SON model.
Figure 6.5: Data retrieval feature class diagram.
In figure 6.6 I have display the SON import code and I have added the code’s
explanation in green, as Java comments. The import SON method accepts an Input-
Stream and returns a SON model, its main utility is to transform an InputStream got
from the chosen file to a SON model to be later drawn in the SON Workcraft plugin.
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1   /* The import SON method accepts an InputStream and returns a SON model, its main 
utility is to transform an InputStream got 
2      from the chosen file to a SON model to be later drawn in the SON Workcraft plugin */
3   public SON importSON(InputStream inputStream) throws DeserialisationException {
4   SON importSON(InputStream inputStream) throws DeserialisationException {
5   SON son = null; //Initialisation of the SON model
6   if (inputStream != null) { //Whenever the input stream is not null, do
7   try {
8   //Initialise an XSSWorkbook object from the input stream. The
9   XSSWorkbook object is an object present in the Apache POI library. The
10   apache POI library has been added as an external library to the plugin.
11   XSSFWorkbook workbook = new XSSFWorkbook(inputStream);
12   //Get the first sheet of the Excel file.
13   XSSFSheet defaultSheet = workbook.getSheetAt(0);
14   //Get a row iterator from the sheet
15   Iterator<Row> rowIterator = defaultSheet.iterator();
16   if (rowIterator != null) {
17   //Instanciate the son object
18   son = new SON();
19   //Iterate over the excel sheet rows
20   while (rowIterator.hasNext()) {
21   //Instantiate a POI row each time there is an Excel row.
22   Row row = rowIterator.next();
23   // We’re going to iterate over the cells now
24   Iterator<Cell> cellIterator = row.cellIterator();
25   boolean conditionConstruction = true; //Allways begin
26   with condition
27   // Each cell is a node, instantiate the Node object.
28   Node node = null;
29   // This node has a previous node?
30   Node previousNode = null;
31   // Iterate over the row’s cell.
32   while (cellIterator.hasNext()) {
33   // Get the cell
34   Cell cell = cellIterator.next();
35   // Get the cell value
36   String cellValue = cell.getStringCellValue();
37   // Instanciate a node from the node text value
38   node = son.getNodeByReference(cellValue);
39   if(conditionConstruction){ //
40   If conditionConstruction is
41   true and node is null → it is a condition
42   if(node == null){
43   // Instantiate the condition from the cell value
44   Condition condition = (Condition)son.createCondition(
45   cellValue, null);
46   // Set the label of the condition
47   condition.setLabel(cellValue);
48   node = condition;
49   }
50   }else{ // If
51   conditionConstruction is false and node is null → it is
an
52   event
53   if(node == null){
54   // Instantiate the event
55   Event event = (Event)son.createNode(cellValue, null,
56   Event.class);
57   // set the event label from cell value
58   event.setLabel(cellValue);
59   node = event;
60   }
61   }
62   
63   
Figure 6.6: The code.
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1   if(previousNode != null){ //If it hasn’t a previous node,
2   connects previous node to current node
3   son.connect(previousNode, node, Semantics.PNLINE);
4   }
5   if(conditionConstruction){ // Switch back the
6   conditionConsutruction (true → false or false → true)
7   conditionConstruction = false;
8   }else{
9   conditionConstruction = true;
10   }
11   previousNode = node;
12   }
13   }
14   }
15   // Finally close the POI workbook before returning the SON model
16   workbook.close();
17   } catch (Exception exception) {
18   throw new DeserialisationException(exception);
19   }
20   }
21   // Return the SON model
22   return son;
23   }
Figure 6.7: Part two of the code
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6.5 Evaluating the SONCraft Plug-in
part1code This section evaluates the SONCraft plug-in using principles of user in-
terface interactions. The evaluation will be based on the user interface and will use
a well-known concept called Usability Heuristics for User Interface Design by Jakob
Nielsen [52].
The first heuristic is the visibility of system status. The SONCraft clearly im-
plements this feature, which tells the user what is occurring while the platform is in
use. For instance, the users will always be informed of any tools the SONCraft picked
up. Additionally, if some non-logical steps are taken during the creation of the SON
model (e.g., if the user tries to link two events directly or connect two places), the
plug-in will warn the users. Ideally, the user would be provided with the complete
steps taken after he/she finishes building a model. This feature would allow users to
trace the steps while constructing the models.
The second heuristic is the match between the system and the real world, and
the SONCraft plug-in meets this criterion. For instance, the menu and panels are
the same as other similar tools used today. However, some tools do not meet this
criterion. For example, the zooming tool in the SONCraft model shows a lack of
accuracy, meaning that the user may find it difficult to zoom in on a particular part
of the model. In other words, when the user tries to zoom in on part of the model,
the zooming tool will move to the far left side instead of focusing on the desired part.
Additionally, the shortcuts of some tools do not match the general expectations. For
instance, in standard software, the user utilises (Ctrl+ ’+’) to zoom in and (Ctrl+’-’)
to zoom out; however, (Ctrl+’=’) is used to zoom in when using the SONCraft model.
The third heuristic is user control and freedom. This means the user can undo
his/her actions if a mistake is made. This feature exists in the SONCraft model; the
user can easily undo and redo actions.
Another heuristic of usability is consistency and standards [52], which means
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the user does not need to inquire about words, situations or actions while using
particular tools. Although the SONCraft plug-in uses different terminologies for parts
of the tool, these designations are due the terminologies used for the model (SONs),
which include places, events and channel places. However, the main menu meets
this heuristic of usability, including common terms such as “file”, “edit”, “view” and
“tools”.
The fifth heuristic of usability is error prevention. The system not only provides a
warning message to the user but will also first try to prevent the error. SONCraft has
this feature; for instance, the user cannot link two events or places with each other.
6.6 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, we presented SONCraft, an open-source platform used to model,
analyse, and visualise SONs. SONCraft provides an easy-to-use user interface that
helps users in modelling and analysing particular cases, as well as in model validation.
SONs and their features within SONCraft are now being extended to new applications.
Also, different tools included in SONCraft were presented, such as editing, struc-
tural analysis, simulation, and scenario generation tools, as well as Time SON tools.
We have also provided details of the plug-in used to load big data, as well as our
solution to the overlapping issues with this plug-in. We have integrated these tools
with SONCraft to detect cybercrime cases with a large, complex evolving model. In
the future, we plan to allow SONCraft to integrate with large-scale visualisation tools
such as Hadoop. The current SONCraft plug-in already appropriately and effectively
supports visualisation. However, analysing big data requires some abilities that exist
in Hadoop. This kind of integration will allow the platform to be used in the indus-




Conclusion and Future work
7.1 Conclusion
This thesis presents the extension of the SON framework. For example, this frame-
work improves both handling and visualising data sets involved in cybercrime inves-
tigations.
In Chapter 2, the background of SONs and their features were presented. More-
over, the visualisation background, the visualisation stages and visualisation tech-
niques were presented, and the background of the domain name system was discussed.
In Chapter 3, the limitations of visualisation in SONs were described in terms of
visualising large data sets. Moreover, the challenges resulting from the overlapping
and out-of-order placements of ONs were addressed. Also, a novel solution was pro-
posed to deal with this issue based on a maximal step execution policy. Furthermore,
additional algorithms were provided to address such challenges. Finally, a plug-in
that deals with this problem was implemented, and results obtained were discussed.
In Chapter 4, a DNS tunnelling attack was investigated. Moreover, the detection
of that threat and how it occurred was provided. The SON model and its features
for detecting DNS tunnelling in the event of an actual attack were provided, and a
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plug-in was implemented to detect this kind of attack.
Chapter 5 reported the motivation of producing new definition in SON, called
visualisation and abstract conditions in SON (coloured tokens). The formal definition
of this extension was provided and approved in this section. The background of
basic Petri nets, coloured Petri nets and big data was discussed in this chapter as
well. Finally, we discuss different scenarios and examples of how to apply the new
extensions to different examples of SONs.
Chapter 6 presented the SONCraft plug-in which is used help users in automat-
ically load large amounts of data. Finally, we evaluate the SONCraft plug-in using
principles of user interface interactions.
7.2 Future work
With regard to future work identified at the end of each chapter, various opportunities
exist and some concerns remain to be addressed in the area of SONs. In this section,
we enumerate and discuss these possibilities in more detail.
7.2.1 Visualisation of behavioural abstraction through max-
imal concurrency policy
One of the directions of the future work involves implementing visualisation based on
local maximal concurrency [41]. This is a step execution policy that introduces an
extension of the basic model of Petri nets by adding the notion of located transitions
and locally maximally concurrent executions of co-located transitions to represent the
compartmentalisation of membrane systems [41]. The main idea relates to specifying
the locality for event, with each event belonging to a fixed unique locality. The
precise mechanism to achieve this goal involves introducing a partition of the set of
all transitions using locality mapping [9].
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7.2.2 Detection of multi-attacks and use of different DNS
tunnelling tools
Although we obtained promising results with regard to detection of DNS attacks
using SON, the time limitation prevented us from considering several multi-attacks
simultaneously. In other words, if more than one attack occurs in very complex
scenarios, the problem becomes more interesting. However, the current SONs still
need improvement in terms of visualisation. The analysis of more than one attack
is necessary to evaluate the ability of SON from two main perspectives. The first
concerns multiple levels of SONs. For instance, as seen in Figure 7.1, we focus on two
levels of DNS protocol, namely the client side and the local server DNS.
Figure 7.1: SON Model for Normal DNS protocol .
However, as can be seen in Figure 7.1, the DNS protocol has more than one level,
such as the DNS root server and the LTD server (e.g., ’.com and .net’). Investigations
into more than one level of DNS protocols will be very complex and challenging as
well. In addition, it is interesting to use DNS tunnelling tools other than ‘iodine’
to compare various attack behaviours and assess how the algorithm deals with these
types of attacks.
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7.2.3 Investigation of large data sets using coloured tokens
of SONs
Using coloured tokens of SONs will allow modelling and analysis of large, sophisticated
data sets — for instance, Twitter, which is used extensively in today’s world. The
crime has increased in Twitter and other social media. The size of the data set poses
challenges in analysing such platforms. However, we believe that after improving
SONs to deal with large amounts of data, one can expect a suitable result with
regard to crime detection. Thus, the identification and detection of crime in Twitter
and social media continue to pose challenges to investigators. Notably, SONs have
provided good results in the cybercrime detection field in chapter 4. The idea is to
implement a tool that read the public data on Twitter automatically and convert it
into SON models. After that, provide algorithms that can identify any particular
crime patterns.
7.2.4 Data mining and SONs
Both data mining and process mining provide exemplary techniques and tools for
visualisation. The combined implementation of these technologies and SONs could
provide novel analysis or visualisation results. Visualisation and analysis models
automated with the features of SONs (which can be achieved via data mining) could
outperform manual capture of behaviours and the analysis that follows. Extraction
of patterns and knowledge using both data mining and SONs could also prove to be
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